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One cannot understand constitutional law separately from other
important jurisdictions. A comparative perspective helps us un-
derstand that any system of constitutional law both originates and
gains nourishment from past, common, conventional behavior and
legal traditions.
Modern constitutional control systems around the world must
include constitutional and legal provisions to regulate the compo-
sition of courts and to list the functions that the judiciary must
fulfill.1 Moreover, there are also other political and legal issues
that control systems need to solve. The worldwide trend to im-
plement constitutional tribunals is one of the solutions to such
issues, and is one of the most representative phenomena in consti-
tutional and procedural law.2 A problem arises, however, in de-
1. Luis Lopez Guerra. Constitutional Law Professor and Former Judge to the Spanish
Constitutional Court, The Functions of Constitutional Courts, Washington D.C., (Jun 7,
2002) (transcript summary available online at
http://www.aals.orgtprofdev/constitutionalllopezguerra.html).
2. EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR, LOS TRIBUNALES CONST1TUCIONALES EN
IBEROAMERICA (THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS IN IBERO-AMERICA) 27 (FUNDAP eds., 1st
ed. 2002). The author explains that countries today create constitutional courts, as high
courts, within and without the judicial structures, seeking to resolve conflicts arising from
the interpretation and application of the constitutional norms. Id. This trend developed
after the second half of the twentieth century in Ibero-America. Id. The author then pro-
vides examples of countries with different constitutional courts. Id. He highlights those
that act independently from the judicial power, such as those in Chile, Ecuador, Spain,
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termining the powers that should be granted to such constitution-
al courts. Furthermore, procedural rules present another issue
and should be carefully crafted in constitutional control systems to
direct the courts' attention to constitutional breaches involving
fundamental rights and liberties or to solve constitutional conflicts
between relevant governmental actors within the state. The legal
discipline of constitutional procedural law provides the procedures
that courts apply when adjudging constitutional infractions ac-
cording to the functions expressly entrusted to them in the consti-
tution and through legislation. An analysis of constitutional con-
trol systems, therefore will certainly include a study of the proce-
dures that protect government structures, along with remedies
established to protect individual and social rights at national and
international levels, such as the Inter-American system of Human
Rights.
This presentation is intended to address the historical origins of
Costa Rica's constitutional remedies specifically, and to provide an
overview of the type of rights protected in each case, such as
standing and ripeness, all as relevant functions and roles of the
Costa Rican constitutional control system.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION SYSTEMS
Constitutions are the highest legal norm of any country. They
limit the power of the different branches of government by design-
ing the governmental structure through which authority shall be
used for the common good. Furthermore, constitutions provide an
enumeration of liberties and social rights that restrain the holders
of power.
Latin American countries followed similar paths in determining
how to enforce their Constitutions. Their practices, however, dif-
fer from the central role that courts play in the United States in
protecting the Constitution. Although the constitutionalization in
Latin America originally came from traditions of the United
States, others came from Europe.3 The remedies to enforce the
Guatemala, Peru and Portugal. Id. He also highlights independent courts within the judi-
cial power, such as those in Bolivia and Colombia. Id. There are also specialized chambers
of the Supreme Courts of Justice, such as those in El Salvador, Costa Rica, Nicaragua,
Paraguay, and Venezuela. Id. The other type of court is one with broader subject matter
jurisdiction, or an ordinary supreme court, which acts as a constitutional court sharing
non-exclusive jurisdiction on constitutional questions, such as those in Argentina, Brazil,
Honduras, Mexico, Panama and Uruguay. Id.
3. ALLAN R. BREWER-CARtAS, JuDIcIAL REVIEW IN CoMPARATIvE LAW 67-70 (1989).
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constitutions have become synthesized through the centuries by
the Spanish and Latin American culture.4
Constitutions and the laws derived from them delegate many
functions to constitutional courts around the world. These delega-
tions enable the courts to exercise more or less control over the
different branches of government, their policies, and specific gov-
ernmental actions that affect the people.
Some of the constitutional adjudication systems in the world are
the result of a mixture of well-defined and differentiated models of
constitutional justice. 5 The American or "diffusive" model of con-
stitutional justice is based on concrete judicial proceedings in
which petitioners obtain redress in cases between parties in con-
flict. Judicial review serves to protect their individual rights. The
judgment entered is inter partes.6 The general effects of such de-
cisions are limited by existing precedent and the principle of stare
decisis.
The European system of constitutional adjudication, originating
with Kelsen's model 7 of constitutional justice, consists of concen-
trated and specialized courts that resolve conflicts or controversies
between the different branches of government. The grounds of
this system, therefore, are founded in the protection of the consti-
tutional order, where the public powers of government are ad-
judged in abstracto, and not in relation to specific cases regarding
individual rights in an ordinary court. The decisions of such bod-
ies have erga omnes effects.8
4. ROBERT S. BARKER, CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION: THE COSTA RICAN
EXPERIENCE 2-9 (2008).
5. Rodolfo Piza Escalante, Justice of the Costa Rican Constitutional Chamber, La
Justicia Constitucional en Costa Rica (The Constitutional Justice in Costa Rica) 1-7
(Oct. 10-14, 1995) (unpublished Speech at the First Conference of Constitutional
Courts in Ibero-america, Spain and Portugal, at Lisboa, Portugal) (on file with au-
thor).
6. Inter partes is a Latin phrase that is defined as, "[b]etween parties. Instruments in
which two persons unite, each making conveyance to, or engagement with, the other... "
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 565 (6th ed., 1994). Within the context of this article on judicial
proceedings, it should mean the binding consequences of a judicial decision imposed upon
the parties in conflict.
7. Jose L6pez Guerra et al., The Role of the Constitutional Court in the Consoli-
dation of the Rule of Law 20 [Council of Europe, 1994]. This author in his speech as-
serted that "[tlhe role and competences of the constitutional court" affirms that "[t]he
Kelsenian model of constitutional justice provides for a court which is distinct and separate
from the ordinary court system, with a different composition and different procedures, and
having the power to examine the constitutionality of norms passed by Parliament and, if
necessary, to annul any such norms found to be in conflict with the constitutional text." Id.
8. MANUEL OSSORIO, DICCIONARIO DE CIENCIAS JURiDICAS POLUTICAS Y SOCIALES
[JURIDICAL, POLITICAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES DICTIONARY] 393 (Editorial Heliasta eds.,
24th ed. 1997). '"ocucidn latina. Contra todos o respecto de todos. Se empleajurdicamente
246 Vol. 49
Spring 2011 Costa Rican Constitutional Jurisdiction
Depending upon the system, modern constitutions will be em-
phasized in varying degrees. It is possible, therefore, to find cus-
tom-made combinations that include elements of several systems.
For example, the Costa Rican constitutional control system is
mainly derived from the European system, but a broader concept
of constitutional control systems, finds in Latin American coun-
tries an order of common characteristics that give way to the
Ibero-american Model of Constitutional Justice.9
A. The Costa Rican System
1. Components of Costa Rica's Government
The constitution defines Costa Rica as a free, and independent
democratic republic, 10 with a unitary system of government. Ac-
cording to the constitution,1' the republic consists of three inde-
pendent branches: the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judici-
ary. However, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is also considered
to be a branch of government, because of its specific constitutional
attributes.1 2 Consequently, the constitution not only defines the
administrative, legislative, and judicial branches of government,
but the electoral jurisdiction 3 as well.
para calificar aquellos derechos cuyos efectos se producen con relaci6n a todos, y se diferen-
cian de los que solo afectan a persona o personas determinadas. Asi, los derechos reales, en
general, son erga omnes... " [Latin phrase. Against all or for all. Legally used to qualify
the rights whose impact is in relation to all, and they differ from those that only affect the
person or persons. Thus, property rights, in general, are erga omnes .. I Erga omnes
should be contextualized in countries where constitutional judicial decisions have an im-
pact on the government and society, as a whole, even if they have not been engaged in the
judicial proceeding.
9. Piza Escalante, supra note 5, at 3-7. The former President of the Constitutional
Chamber and former President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights explains that
he shares with Allan Brewer Carias, the existence of an lbero-american Model of Constitu-
tional Justice, that more or less sprouts from common grounds among these countries. Id.
It is highlighted that these countries rely on extensive regulated constitutions; have gener-
ous legal treatment in standing; on the coexistence of different forms of diffusive and con-
centrated systems of judicial review; that popular sovereignty resides in the Constitution
through which democracy survives; many of the constitutional remedies (amparo and habe-
as corpus) are instruments of immediate and direct appeal, not just destined for the final
stages of the litigation as happens in Europe; the justiciability of a broader range of funda-
mental rights. Id. Not only civil and political rights as in Europe, but also economic, social
and cultural rights, among others as the performance rights required from the State. Id.
10. CONSTITUcI6N DE LA REPfiBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 [CONSTITUTION] art. 1.
11. Id. atart. 9.
12. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [SCCSJ] [Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice] May 24, 1991, SCIJ, No. 1991-0980 (Costa Rica).
13. Constituci6n de la Rep6blica de Costa Rica de 1949 [Constitution] arts. 99 and
102. The Supreme Electoral Tribunal is the highest constitutional body with exclusive
jurisdiction and control over the organization of the electoral rights concerning Costa Rican
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The Supreme Court of Justice's members are elected by legisla-
tors every eight years, and are eligible for reelection. 14 Members
of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (which organizes, controls and
monitors elections to preserve their integrity) are elected by the
members of the Supreme Court of Justice for six-year terms.
15
The President of Costa Rica has attenuated powers, that is,
most of his or her decisions require the concurrence of other public
officials, like a minister or cabinet secretary. 16 This makes the
presidential office weak in relation to the strong presidential offic-
es common in other Latin American countries.
Costa Rica has a fifty-seven member unicameral legislature
17
that is responsible for making ordinary legislation, or legislation
to approve treaties and to amend the constitution. It has other
important functions related to popular representation, the politi-
cal control of government, and others.
The judiciary is organized into original, appellate, and special-
ized jurisdictional systems. 18 For example in civil cases, small
claim courts (Juzgados de Menor Cuantia) and other courts
(Juzgados de Mayor Cuantia) have original jurisdiction, according
to the territorial circumscription, subject matter, and the estimat-
ed value of the litigation. In general, other courts are organized in
citizens and of those bodies in charge of guaranteeing the purity of national and municipal
elections. Article 99 establishes: 'The organization, administration, and supervision of
acts pertaining to suffrage are the exclusive function of the Supreme Electoral Tribunal,
which enjoys independence in the performance of its duties. All other electoral organs are
subordinate to the Tribunal." Id. at art. 99. The functions of the Supreme Electoral Tribu-
nal are found in article 102. The powers given by the Constitution are to convoke popular
elections; the interpretation, with exclusive and binding effect, over all constitutional and
legal provisions on electoral matters; the rendering of decisions to claims made by parties
regarding political partiality of State officials and other irregular conducts of public offi-
cials; to adopt, with respect to the police force, appropriate measures to ensure that elec-
tions are carried out under conditions of unrestricted freedom and guarantees. It also con-
ducts the final count of the votes cast in the elections for President and Vice President,
Legislative Assembly members, Municipal Government members. It also renders the offi-
cial declaration, in national and local elections, as well as in the referendum process. There
are other functions not mentioned but relevant to the electoral process.
14. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPfJBMCA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 156-57.
15. Id. at art. 100-01.
16. Id. at art. 146.
17. Id. at art. 106.
18. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPIOBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 153. This article reads
as follows:
In addition to the functions vested in it by this Constitution, the Judicial Branch
shall hear civil, criminal, commercial, labour, and administrative-litigation cases, as
well as any other established by law, regardless of their nature or the status of the
persons involved; enter final resolutions thereon and execute the judgments entered,
with the assistance of law enforcement forces, if necessary.
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specialized jurisdictions, so they may have original subject matter
jurisdiction over labor, civil, criminal, or other matters. Costa Ri-
ca therefore has agrarian, administrative, criminal, civil, and la-
bor courts, among others.
The decisions of the courts with original jurisdiction can be re-
viewed by the appellate Superior Courts. Appeals from all courts
proceed vertically. Certain errors of fact and/or of law can be re-
viewed by a timely, direct attack before one of three Chambers of
the Supreme Court of Justice. Each Chamber specializes in dif-
ferent subject matters. The First Chamber specializes in adminis-
trative and civil matters, the Second Chamber specializes in labor
and family law, and the Third Chamber specializes in criminal
law issues. 19 The Chambers may repeal or annul the decisions of
the lower courts.20
Prior to 1989, all members of the three Chambers of the Su-
preme Court of Justice composed the Plenary Court. The Plenary
Court at that time was the head and administrative organ of the
judiciary, and was the precursor to the current constitutional
court. The promulgation of a fourth Chamber of the Supreme
Court of Justice changed this system. 21 The fourth Chamber was
created through a constitutional amendment in 1989 to correct the
perceived deficiencies of the constitutional control system, as well
as the deficiencies of the adjudication of fundamental rights in
general.
2. The Creation of the Fourth Chamber
Before the constitutional amendment creating the fourth
Chamber, Costa Rica had a "passive" constitutional system of ad-
19. LEY No. 8 DEL 29 DE NOVIEMBRE DE 1937, LEY ORGANICA DEL PODER JUDICIAL
[ORGANIC LAW OF THE JUDICIAL POWER] art. 93, 56 (COSTA RICA). There have been several
important reforms concerning criminal procedure, in which the Third Chamber shares the
jurisdiction with the Superior Courts of Criminal Cassation. This, however, will change in
the future with the "Creaci6n del Recurso de Apelaci6n de la Sentencia, otras reformas al
R6gimen de Impugnaci6n e Implementaci6n de Nuevas Reglas de Oralidad en el Proceso
Penal," Ley n0 8837 del 3 de Mayo de 2010 (Creation of the Appellate Recourse of Rulings,
other reforms relating to the System of Appeals and Implementation of the new oral rules
on Criminal Procedure), Law No. 8837 of May 3, 2010. This law will enter into force on
December 10, 2011.
20. See Su HISTORIA, ORGANIZACI6N Y FUNCIONAMIENTO [HISTORY, ORGANIZATION AND
OPERATION] COSTA RICAN JUDICIAL POWER, http://www.poder-
judicial.go.cr/generalidadespj/historia.html (last visited May 18, 2011). The official cite
explains in more detail the current legal developments of the Costa Rican judiciary, its
structure, jurisdictions and procedures.
21. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 10 (amended 1989).
249
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judication.22 As a concentrated system, the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice had the judicial review of statutes and provisions of the execu-
tive power, and the writs of habeas corpus. The criminal judges
and one of the Chambers of the Supreme Court of Justice would
adjudge the writs of amparo.23 The individual and social rights
were protected in a split system with no appellate recourse; there-
fore, judicial decisions did not have a higher court to ensure uni-
form constitutional standards. And many times the lack of legal
mechanisms that served as political solving proceedings-perceived
as necessary instruments for good governance-to resolve many
other conflicts and constitutional questions, among the different
branches of Government.
Ousting the old constitutional control system through amend-
ments would improve the constitution and, therefore, the legal
system, even though some critics thought that simply changing
the interpretation and opinion of the judges would solve many
problems. 24 The truly detrimental effect of the old constitutional
control system was the high voting requirement. This caused the
endurance of statutes and executive decrees if they were not an-
nulled by the members of the Supreme Court, which created an
intended presumption of the constitutionality of legislative and
executive provisions. 25 Statutes of limitation prevented further
judicial review attempts if the final decision did not declare the
provision unconstitutional. Nevertheless, in a small number of
cases, the Plenary Court struck down several conflicting laws on
constitutional grounds, which had very positive implications for
all political parties.26
22. The Fourth Chamber (Sala Cuarta or Sala IV) as it is known in Costa Rica will be
mentioned and treated hereon as the Constitutional Chamber.
23. The writ of amparo is a summary proceeding designed to discuss claims involving
fundamental right breaches (individual and social rights), it provides for an injunction
relief with the exception of those rights relating to personal liberty, that are protected by
the writ of habeas corpus.
24. CARLOS JoSt GUTItRREZ ET AL., DERECHO CONSTITUTIONAL COSTARICENSE [COSTA
RICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW] 34 (Editorial Juricentro S.A. ed., 1983).
25. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 10. See also, BARKER,
supra note 4, at 9-11. Professor Barker explains with great accuracy the historical mo-
ments of art 10. Id. He has translated the original provision as follows:
Dispositions of the Legislative Power or of the Executive Power which are contrary to
the Constitution shall be absolutely null. [...] The Supreme Court, by vote of no less
than two-thirds of all its members, has the power to declare the unconstitutionality of
dispositions of the Legislative power and decrees of the Executive Power. It shall be
determined by statute which tribunals shall have the power to hear claims of uncon-
stitutionality of other dispositions emanating from the executive power.
Id.
26. GUTItRREZ, supra note 24, at 44.
Vol. 49250
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A constitutional moment, however, came after this long period
of judicial inactivity under a deficient legal structure. In 1989, the
Legislative Assembly enacted new constitutional provisions.2 7 It
amended the powers of judicial review by removing it from the
Plenary Court and placing it in a specialized and concentrated
judicial body, along with the other preexisting Chambers of the
Supreme Court of Justice.
Article 10 of the amended constitution states that:
A specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice shall
declare, by an absolute majority vote of its members, the un-
constitutionality of provisions of any nature and of acts sub-
ject to Public Law. The jurisdictional acts of the Judicial
Branch, the declaration of the elections by the Supreme Elec-
toral Tribunal and any other acts established by law cannot
be challenged following this procedure.
This Chamber shall also:
a)Settle any conflicts of jurisdiction between State branches,
including the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, as well as any oth-
er entities or bodies established by law.
b)Hear any consultations on constitutional amendment bills,
ratification of international agreements or treaties and other
bills, as provided by law.
28
The judicial body would be concentrated and specialized, with
original jurisdiction and no other hierarchical court above it. To
declare legislation and other provisions of law unconstitutional
would require an absolute majority vote of the Chamber, instead
of the two-thirds required in the previous constitutional provision.
Concomitant with the constitutional amendments, a new law
would follow regulating constitutional jurisdiction. The new law
created constitutional remedies and reinforced preexisting ones,
along with the new Chamber of the Supreme Court.
Other articles of the constitution were also amended. Article 48
of the constitution 29 provides for the writ of habeas corpus and the
writ of amparo. Furthermore, the Law of the Constitutional Ju-
27. LEY No. 7128 DE 18 DE AGOSTO DE 1989 REFORMA CONSTITUCIONAL (CREACI6N DE
LA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL) [CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (CREATION OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER)] art. 10, 48, 105, 128 (COSTA RICA).
28. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPI)BLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 10 (amended 1989).
29. Id. at art. 48.
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risdiction 30 regulates in greater detail not only the writ of amparo,
but also the judicial review of legislation (actions of unconstitu-
tionality),31 the advisory jurisdiction, 32 and competence to settle
conflicts between different, constitutionally-relevant entities or
branches of government.3 3 Some of these remedies were intro-
duced in these amendments for the first time, such as certain
types of amparo, the advisory jurisdiction, and the competence to
settle conflicts.
These amendments benefited democracy and the rule of law in
Costa Rica. They aimed to enhance and support the supremacy of
the constitution, in a nation where the law and fundamental
rights were not historically taken for granted by public officials.
Moreover, these amendments were important for ordinary citi-
zens. This evolution characterized Costa Rica's early years, as a
prestigious jurist would claim.
34
3. The Importance of Costa Rica's Fundamental Rights and
the Rule of Law
The same year that Costa Rica acquired its independence in
1821, it adopted a Cadiz Constitution-like document to entrust its
government to uphold the rule of law and regulate fundamental
rights. This was an important event in 1821 for a Central Ameri-
can country, as other countries would have to wait longer for their
constitutions. Guatemala integrated its constitution in 1823,
Honduras did so in the Federal Constitution of Central America in
1825, El Salvador did so in 1824, and Nicaragua did so in 1826.
35
The pure reliance on the rule of law provides an answer to the
puzzling question of why Costa Rica developed differently from
30. LEY No. 7135 DE 11 DE OCTUBRE DE 1989 LEY DE LA JURISDICCI6N CONSTITUTIONAL
[LAw OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION]. This is the Costa Rican Constitutional Pro-
cedural Code. Id. It contains in one law, all of the jurisdictional procedures built to guar-
antee the principle of supremacy of the Constitution, its immediate and effective enforce-
ment. Id. It endows the Constitutional Chamber with extraordinary powers to deem the
breaches to the State structure held in the Constitution, fundamental rights and interna-
tional instruments applicable to the Republic, and take the necessary measures to correct
them. Id.
31. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION at art. 73-95.
32. Id. at art. 96-108.
33. Id. at art. 109-11.
34, GUTI9RREZ, supra note 24, at 21. The author relies on the works of a history study
published in Spain for a collection of books on the Ibero-American Constitutions. See
HERNAN G. PERALTA, LAS CONSTITUCIONES DE COSTA RICA [THE COSTA RICAN
CONSTITUTIONS] 4 (Instituto de Estudios Politicos 1962).
35. GUTI9RREZ, supra note 24, at 22. The author cites a previous paper where he ana-
lyzed the philosophical underpinnings of the 1825 Constitution. Id.
Vol. 49252
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the rest of Central America, despite common historical back-
grounds.
In general, along with the other Latin American countries, Cos-
ta Rica's constitutional control system evolved under the civil law
tradition. It was highly influenced by the French Revolution and
to another degree, by the Constitution of the United States. 36 Be-
ginning with the first constitution, the Costa Rican legal system
expresses an excessive respect to the legislative branch of gov-
ernment.
4. The Effect of the Amendments
The rule of law had always been one of the fundamental under-
pinnings of the Costa Rican constitutional process. Prior to 1989,
the lack of constitutional standards and legislative provisions
were often deemed to be unavoidable restraints on the constitu-
tional control system.37 The 1989 amendments had an apparent
solid political base and consensus to enhance the constitutional
adjudication system. These amendments provided the new judi-
cial body with the power to reestablish the long forgotten suprem-
acy of the constitution. The consequences of these amendments
were vastly felt in the life of the national population.
Through the amendments, the jurisdictional law was furnished
with a rich mixture of constitutional and legal mechanisms. It
would not only adjudge individual rights questions, but it also
would allow for standing to defend the constitutional order.
Through these and other procedural mechanisms, the Constitu-
tional Chamber was immediately inserted into a political mine-
field where it had to coexist with other branches of government
(including the rest of the judiciary). Under these circumstances,
the beginning of the Constitutional Chamber was difficult, having
36. Id. at 20-21. The Constitution of the United States was a clear source of inspiration
behind the Latin American constitutional movement, because it regulated an orderly and
legal evolution of a country from a colony to an independent nation. It was an especially
important constitutional source for the Central American Federal Republic and Costa Ri-
ca's version of the "Ley Fundamental del Estado de Costa Rica" in 1825 [Fundamental Law
of the Costa Rican State].
37. Francisco Castillo Gonzilez, Derecho de Impugnaci6n de la Sentencia Conde-
natoria y Derechos Humanos [The Right to Appeal a Conviction and Human Rights],
41 REVISTA DE CIENCIAS JURIDICAS 32 (1980). The article shows at the time, that one
of the main obstacles to guarantee the full extent of the due process clause was an
apparent omission in the Constitution to state the right to appeal, which only operat-




to confront unconstitutional behavior from all government agen-
cies, including the judicial branch, of which it was a part.
This new, efficient constitutional system began changing all
cross-sections of government and of society. It operated directly
from amended articles 10 and 48, which provided basically for the
same remedies as the 1949 constitution, but now provided a con-
centrated and specialized judicial body with a rich base of sub-
stantive individual and collective rights.38
A very recent study, conducted by the Christian Michelsen In-
stitute in Norway, concluded that Costa Rica's amendments to the
constitution and subsequent adoption of the Law of the Constitu-
tional Jurisdiction, encompassed a well-built and well-structured
court, and had strong support from all sectors of Costa Rican soci-
ety. The study stated that:
The court's accountability function was broadly and vigorous-
ly applied to all governmental branches only after the crea-
tion of the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court in
1989. Before 1989, even though the constitution granted the
Supreme Court judicial review powers and considerable levels
of political and financial (operational) independence, the court
was unable or unwilling to fulfill its accountability functions.
The nature of the magistrates (training, class, and so on) was
insignificantly different from magistrates who served on the
pre-reformed Supreme Court.
39
According to the researchers, the consequences of enacting the
1989 constitutional amendments took many of the framers by sur-
prise. 40 Still today, repercussions of the powers given to the court
aggrieve some key political actors who complain loudly about the
court's behavior. Nevertheless, the demand for constitutional jus-
38. CONSTITUcI6N DE LA REP(JBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 10 and 48 (amended
1989).
39. SIRi GLOPPEN, BRUCE M. WILSON, ROBERTO GARGARELLA, ELIN SKAAR & MORTEN
KINANDER, COURTS AND POWERS IN LATIN AMERICA AND AFRICA 81 (Palgrave MacMillan
eds., 111 ed. 2010).
40. Id. at 67. The authors stated the following:
In 1989, during the final parliamentary debate on the constitutional amendment
(Law 7,128), deputies voted by a margin of 43 to 6 in favor of creating the new court
(Murillo 1994: 40). The puzzle of deputies voting to create an institution that would
diminish their own policy-making sovereignty seems, on the surface, to be confusing.
However, interviews with leading actors in the debate over the new court reveal that
many deputies failed to grasp the potential significance of the court they were creat-
ing...
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tice is constant and has popular support. In fact, there is a gen-
eral, growing trend for constitutional justice, ever increasing since
1989.
One aim of the adjudication system was to bring the citizen
closer to the constitutional justice system. This was ensured
through the procedures that would allow open access to this court.
This, however, is also one of today's main concerns. Open access
to the court has resulted in the Constitutional Chamber working
on hundreds of cases each month. In the year 2010 alone, the
Chamber worked on close to twenty thousand cases.
41
The figure in the Appendix represents the historical, growing
trend of writs of habeas corpus, amparo and judicial review cases
from 1989 to 2009, showing that the writ of amparo is the major
source of the Constitutional Chamber's caseload.
42
In 2010 alone, the Constitutional Chamber has rendered 19,320
decisions of various types.43 The writ of amparo represents the
highest count with 17,477 rulings, comprising, over ninety percent
(90.46%) of the decisions of the justices.44 The writs of habeas cor-
pus follow, with 1,482, which represents just over seven percent
(7.67%) of all the decisions rendered. 45  Concerning the judicial
review of statutes or actions of unconstitutionality there were 277,
giving a total close to one and a half percent (1.43%) of the deci-
sions taken by the Constitutional Chamber. 46 Other provisions of
law comprise 191 decisions, totaling approximately one percent
(0.98%) of the total decisions rendered.47 Finally, the advisory ju-
risdiction encompassed only 0.08% of a percent of the 21,038 total
decisions.
48
Consequently, the early success of the Constitutional Chamber
can be found in its procedures, because they guarantee easy avail-
ability and accessibility to any ordinary person, citizen, and non-
citizen, alike. Also, success can be attributed to the fact that the
constitutional litigation was endowed, not only by the coverage of
rights directly applicable from the constitution (as the document
41. See attached Appendix.
42. E-mail from Ana Virginia Madrigal Garcia, Administrative Secretariat (Sept. 9,
2010, 14:53) (on file with author).
43. SALA CONSTITUCIONAL CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, La Sala en Nfmeros 2010





48. SALA CONSTITUCIONAL CORTE SUPREMA DE JUSTICIA, La Sala en Ndimeros 2010
(2011) available at www.poder-judicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/estadisticas.htm.
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where democracy sprouts), but also by incorporating international
human rights standards in Article 48.49 Since the inception of the
Constitutional Chamber, numerous constitutional law books have
been written and university law schools now have specific pro-
grams and enhanced courses on constitutional law and procedural
constitutional law.
50
The 1989 amendments to the constitution and the following en-
actment of the new procedural legislation clearly became an in-
strument to improve democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental
rights and liberties.
II. THE PROCEDURES THAT PROTECT INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND
LIBERTIES: WRITS OF HABEAS CORPUS AND OF AMPARO
The writs of habeas corpus and amparo are designed to protect
individual and social rights from unconstitutional intrusions by
government or private persons.51 They are free, informal, summa-
rized, and prioritized proceedings that restore fundamental and
human rights enshrined in the constitution, any human rights
treaty, or other similar international legal instruments applicable
in Costa Rica.
As can be seen in the attached Appendix, the vast majority of
the Chamber's caseload consists of amparo claims.52 The caseload
has had an important impact on the distribution of the time spent
by the Constitutional Chamber deciding such cases; two-thirds of
49. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 48 (AMENDED 1989).
This article states:
Every person has the right to present writs of habeas corpus to guarantee his free-
dom and personal integrity and writs of amparo to maintain or re-establish the en-
joyment of other rights set forth in this Constitution as well as those of a fundamen-
tal nature established in international human rights instruments, enforceable in the
Republic. Both writs shall be within the jurisdiction of the Chamber indicated in Ar-
ticle 10.
Id. at art. 48.
50. For the equivalent of a J.D., the number of courses will vary from one university to
another, but mainly they include in their syllabuses two to four semesters directly related
to constitutional law. There are also post-graduate degrees, which emphasize human
rights and constitutional law. The importance of educating students in constitutional law
has clearly increased through these past two decades.
51. As will be seen below, the Law of the Constitutional Chamber allows the filing of
writs of amparo against private physical or moral personas. Rarely, writs of habeas corpus
are filed against private individual or private moral persons, however, the Constitutional
Chamber has not ruled out this writ for constitutional infractions to liberty of movement.
There are examples of cases where the Chamber has admitted habeas corpus under these
special circumstances. SCCSJ Apr. 27, 2010 SCIJ 2010-07622 (Costa Rica); SCCSJ Jun. 8,
2006 SCIJ 2006-08192 (Costa Rica).
52. Garcia, supra note 42.
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its sessions involve the amparo and habeas corpus claims, leaving
the rest for other matters that have more direct political implica-
tions. This has resulted in a bill to amend the law of the constitu-
tional jurisdiction (one of them fostered by the Constitutional
Chamber itself) that would create independent sections to adjudge
habeas corpus and amparos. Others have advocated additional
constitutional courts to address the said writs. 53 The legislators,
however, have deviated from this course of action and have creat-
ed an amendment that would undoubtedly diminish much of the
Constitutional Chamber's attributes. This bill is currently at an
early stage of the legislative procedure, before a commission, and
it has not been introduced to the legislative assembly floor.5 4
Should the contents of the proposed reforms remain essentially
unchanged, they will surely inflict substantial harm to the consti-
tutional control system and the protection of individual and collec-
tive rights in the country.55
On October 11, 2010 the Constitutional Chamber instituted an
aggressive plan to reduce many of the problems that it faces with
its current caseload.5 6 Some of the important measures include
the digitalization of all claims. The plan involves developing com-
puter science and incorporating all technical resources in order to
enhance constitutional justice. The reception of documents, the
analysis of the case, and the rendering of the final decision in a
high percentage of cases is now being resolved readily and effi-
ciently, including the notification of the decisions. It is expected to
have a significant impact on costs as well. Less paper will be used
and the time spent by the Chamber from the moment the case is
filed to the instant where the interested party has the decision in
53. ERNESTO JINESTA LOBO ET AL., VEINTE ANOS DE JUSTICIA CONSTITUCIONAL 1989 -
2009 [TWENTY YEARS OF CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE 1989-2009] 238 (Sala Constitucional &
UNED 2009).
54. AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION, COMISION
PERMANENTE DE ASUNTOS JURIDICOS [LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION ON LEGAL AFFAIRS] (Ordi-
nary Session No. 39, Oct.19, 2010); PRIMERA LEGISLATURA DE 1 DE MAYO DE 2010 AL 30 DE
ABRIL DE 2011 [LEGISLATIVE YEAR OF TMAY 1, 2010 TO APRIL 30, 2011], EXPEDIENTE
LEGISLATIVO NO. 17743.
55. There are other bills intended to amend the constitutional control system that
would create constitutional tribunals to address the writs of habeas corpus and amparo, but
keep the Constitutional Chamber for actions of unconstitutionality, conflicts of competence,
and the advisory jurisdiction. See, e.g., EXPEDIENTE LEGISLATIVO No. 17.926 DE 18 DE
NOVIEMBRE DE 2010, on the floor of the Legislative Assembly. This bill is following the first
stages of a Constitutional Amendment according to article 195 of the Constitution, comply-
ing with the reading of the amendment before the Legislative body.
56. Press release, Press and Org'l Commc'n. Dep't. of the Judicial Power, Sala Con-
stitucional reforma plataforma de atenci6n al usuario [Constitutional Chamber amends
citizens service platform] (Oct. 6, 2010) (on file with author).
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hand will be greatly reduced. All cases fied prior to October 11,
2010 remain the same and will be adjudged in the traditional
form.
A. The Habeas Corpus
1. Origins and the Rights Protected
Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor, who studies the history of the Mex-
ican amparo published a study on Iberian and Latin American
constitutional courts.57 He noted that in the Middle Ages in the
Kingdom of Aragon, there existed a high public authority acting
similarly to a constitutional judge, protecting property, rights, and
persons in accordance with a higher order called the "general priv-
ilege," which protected certain fundamental rights.58 The author
also mentions England's Habeas Corpus Amendment Act of May
26, 1679, which regulated this fundamental remedy with great
detail.59 Nevertheless, it has not been disputed that in Costa Rica,
habeas corpus was first known through the Mexican amparo,
which had many forms and first began regulating the amparo-
libertad (protection related to liberty) in Latin America. Yet, there
has been some difficulty to determine the exact origins, leaving
the possibility that it was a direct influence from England.
60
The 1859 Costa Rican Constitution first established the writ of
habeas corpus, and the due process of law clause, but the constitu-
tional provision mandated further regulations to ordinary legisla-
tion.
These regulations came about fifty years after the 1859 Consti-
tution. Even though several bills were fostered by several legisla-
tors, they did not have the support of the legislative assembly to
be enacted. It was not until November 13, 1909 that the country
57. EDUARDO FERRER MAC-GREGOR, LAACCION CONSTITUTIONAL DE AMPARO EN
MExIcO Y ESPANA EsTuDIo DE DERECHO COMPARADO [THE CONSTITUTIONAL ACTION OF
AMAPARO IN MEXICO AND SPAIN A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF LAw] 7-18 (Editorial Porrua eds.,
3d ed. 2002).
58. Id.
59. FERRER MAC-GREGOR, supra note 2, at 34.
60. JUAN GERARDO QUESADA MORA, HABEAS CoRPus (GARANTIA PROCESAL
CONSTITUTIONAL PARA LA DEFENSA DE LA LIBERTAD PERSONAL Y OTROS DERECHOS
CONEXOS) [THE HABEAS CORPUS (CONSTITUTIONAL PROCEDURAL GUARANTEE FOR THE
DEFENSE OF PERSONAL LIBERTAD AND OTHER CORRELATED RIGHTS] 215-19 (Editorial Inves-
tigaciones Juridicas S.A., 1st ed. 2005).
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had, for the first time, Law No. 4, which regulated habeas corpus
in Costa Rica.6
1
More recently, the 1949 Constitution articulated, in Article 48,
the right of every person to have the recourse of habeas corpus
when unlawfully deprived of his or her liberty.6 2 Today, after the
1989 amendment to the constitution, everyone has the right to file
writs of habeas corpus to guarantee his or her freedom and per-
sonal integrity.63 This protects the freedom of movement, but also
more specifically personal security, morally and physically speak-
ing.
The law relating to the constitutional jurisdiction, 64 is a com-
prehensive legal document that secures many more individual
rights than those explicitly detailed in the constitution. According
to Article 15, habeas corpus guarantees freedom and personal in-
tegrity against the acts and omissions of an authority of any kind,
including the judiciary. 65 It also protects against threats to free-
dom, and disruptions or restrictions improperly established by
authorities, as well as against the illegitimate restrictions of one's
right to move from one place to another in the republic, and one's
freedom to stay, exit and enter into its territory.
66
61. LEY DE HABEAS CORPUS [LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS) arts. 1, 2 and 3
(COLLECCI6N DE LEYES Y DECRETOS ToMo 2, SEMESTRE 2, PAGINA 361(1909))
(COLLECTION OF LAWS AND DECREES, VOLUME 2, SEMESTER 2, PAGE 361 (1909)); and
CARLOS JOSt GUTItRREZ, LA JURISDICCI6N CONSTITUCIONAL [THE CONSTITUTIONAL
JURISDICTION] 192 (Editorial Juricentro S.A. 1993). See also BARKER, supra note 4, at
12.
62. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 48. This article indi-
cated:
Everyone has the right to habeas corpus when considered unlawfully deprived of his
liberty. This recourse shall be exclusively known by the Supreme Court of Justice,
and it will be under its decision to order the appearance of the victim ... maintain or
restore the enjoyment of the other rights enshrined in this Constitution, all persons
shall have.., the writ of amparo, which will be under the Courts established by law.
Id. Further information on the enforcement of the writ of amparo prior to 1989, see
BARKER, supra note 4, at 15.
63. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPtBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 48 (amended 1989).
This article indicates:
Every person has the right to present writs of habeas corpus to guarantee his free-
dom and personal integrity and writs of amparo to maintain or re-establish the en-
joyment of other rights set forth in this Constitution as well as those of a fundamen-
tal nature established in international human rights instruments, enforceable in the
Republic. Both writs shall be within the jurisdiction of the Chamber indicated in Ar-
ticle 10.
Id.






The jurisdictional law establishes habeas corpus and the am-
paro as informal, summarized and prioritized proceedings above
all others, with habeas corpus having preference over the ampa-
ros. It has, however, been the Chamber's long practice that cer-
tain amparos will immediately follow the writ of habeas corpus in
its sessions.
Any person may file a writ of habeas corpus, either for the pro-
tection of oneself or for any other individual. The Constitutional
Chamber has held that the absence or invalid power of attorney
will not invalidate standing in any amparo claim, since anyone
can directly file a petition.67 However, the latter can be limited. In
other cases, the Constitutional Chamber has held that it must be
natural, that the petitioner must have the interested party's con-
sent,68 and that any petitioner in favor of another must exhibit a
certain degree of interest in the case. 69
Additionally, any written document will be enough to meet the
procedural standards. As a matter of fact, people are allowed to
use any type of paper to file a habeas corpus (or an amparo). For
example, detainees have been known to sign petitions on papers
such as bread and paper cartons,70 and telegrams are free of
charge.
The proceedings are also free of cost to the claimant.7 1 There is
no need for the petitioner to retain a lawyer, and the claimant's
signature does not need to be authenticated. 72 Normally, for judi-
cial proceedings, all petitions must be signed by the interested
party, authenticated by a lawyer, who is responsible for all of its
contents.7 3 In response, the government official must submit a
written statement and include with it all judicial and administra-
tive files in its possession containing the pertinent data.7 4 The
67. Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicia [SCCSJ] [Constitutional
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice] Oct. 7, 1994, SCIJ, No. 1994-5862 (Costa Rica).
68. SCCSJ, Nov. 24, 1994, SCIJ, No. 1994-6951 (Costa Rica).
69. SCCSJ, Apr. 28, 1995, SCIJ, No. 1995-2093 (Costa Rica).
70. BRUCE M. WILSON, ENFORCING RIGHTS AND EXERCISING AN ACCOUNTABILITY
FUNCTION: COSTA RICA'S CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 60 (Gretchen Helmke & Julio Rios-
Figueroa eds., 2011).
71. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 18; WILSON, supra note 70.
72. Id.
73. LEY NO. 7130 DE 16 DE AGOSTO DE 1989, CODIGO PROCESAL CIVIL [CIVIL
PROCEDURE CODE] art. 114 (Costa Rica); DECRETO EJECUTIVO NO. 20 DE 17 DE JULIO
DE 1942 REGLAMENTO INTERIOR DEL COLEGIO DE ABOGADOS [INTERIOR REGULATIONS
OF THE LAWYER'S BAR ASSOCIATION] Art. 29 (Costa Rica).
74. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION arts. 19, 21, 22, and 23.
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Constitutional Chamber will then administer a written oath to the
public official when summoned. 75 Therefore, following the oath, he
or she may be individually held accountable for omissions or false
statements.
The openness of the constitutional jurisdiction guarantees ac-
cess to the constitutional protection and assures that minorities
and the poor, who are generally not well represented otherwise,
will have an effective voice. Thus, the constitutional jurisdiction
provides a very important opportunity for marginalized individu-
als and groups in the country.
3. Ripeness
The Constitutional Chamber can accept cases to protect against
threats to freedom and disruptions or restrictions improperly
caused by government authorities of either an administrative or of
judicial nature.76 This includes acts or omissions of any kind that
infringe upon personal liberty and integrity.
The nature of the writ of habeas corpus is mainly a procedural
remedy characterized by summary and provisional decrees.
Therefore, it should be simple, informal, and have appropriate
safeguards for all of the parties involved.
77
It can be used to fight illegitimate restrictions on an individual's
right to free movement in the country, as well as foreign travel.
Any breach made by a state must come from administrative or
judicial authorities. On the other hand, in criminal cases, the
Constitutional Chamber will not accept any petitions for habeas
corpus once the conviction has been entered because there are
other remedies arranged to directly contest the judgment.
78
B. The Writ of Protection (amparo)
1. Origins
The writ of amparo's origin can be traced to Mexico in the Yu-
cateca State Constitution of 1841. 79 However, proceedings similar
to amparo were also brought to the Americas before its independ-
ence from Spain. For example, the colonial writ of protection (am-
75. Id. at art. 19 and 44.
76. Id. at art 15.
77. SCCSJ, Jan. 15, 1992, SCIJ, No. 1992-00072 (Costa Rica).
78. SCCSJ, Jul. 27, 1994, SCIJ, No. 1994-3773 (Costa Rica).
79. LA ACCION CONSTITUTIONAL, supra note 57, at 72.
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paro colonial) had to be filed before the Viceroys and the Captain
Generals. As hierarchical agents, they would prevent inferior offi-
cials, and even private persons, from acting upon others through
the use of their position in society.
The writ of amparo was first regulated in Costa Rica in 1950.
This came after a controversial election process in 1947. The op-
position party called for a general strike, but the government
blocked two radio stations from announcing the movement.80 A
writ of habeas corpus was filed, but it proved to be incapable of
protecting the freedom of speech, because the court found that it
was out of the constitutional scope. Further events followed,
which tainted the elections and consequently caused a civil war in
1948. Once the opposition party took power and the 1949 consti-
tution was enacted, it included not only the habeas corpus, but
also, for the first time, the writ of amparo, in favor of individual
and social rights. However, the enactment and enforcement of it
restricted the amparo to only cover individual rights. Therefore it
was struck down on constitutional grounds and reenacted in 1952
through Law No. 35 of November 24, 1952.81 It remained in force
until it was abolished by the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdic-
tion.8 2
2. The Rights Protected
Along with the writ of habeas corpus, Article 48 of the constitu-
tion also regulates the right to file the writ of protection or am-
paro.8 3 Therefore, the constitution guarantees the maintenance or
reestablishment of the other rights not covered by the writ of ha-
beas corpus and those of a fundamental nature established in in-
ternational human rights instruments that are enforceable in the
republic.
80. LA JURISDICcI6N CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 61, at 197.
81. LA JURISDICcI6N CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 61, at 198.
82. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION, art. 113.
83. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPfIBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 48 (amended
1989). Article 48 states:
Every person has the right to present writs of habeas corpus to guarantee his free-
dom and personal integrity and writs of amparo to maintain or re-establish the en-
joyment of other rights set forth in this Constitution as well as those of a fundamen-
tal nature established in international human rights instruments, enforceable in the
Republic. Both writs shall be within the jurisdiction of the Chamber indicated in Ar-
ticle 10.
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Very shortly after the creation of the Constitutional Chamber, a
set of decisions brought to light the long dormant constitutional
order. The constitution already enumerated individual rights and
guarantees, social rights and guarantees, other rights relating to
Costa Rican nationality, foreigners' rights and duties, rights relat-
ing to religion, education, and culture, and political rights and du-
ties. Allowing the direct, domestic application of human rights
treaties and other such standards was a change from the Supreme
Court's prior stance on these issues in the past.
Moreover, the writ of amparo now embraced the guaranteed
rights under the American Convention on Human Rights and oth-
er international instruments dealing with fundamental rights that
are applicable to Costa Rica.8 4 The right to appeal a decision un-
der the American Convention on Human Rights was not recog-
nized expressly in the constitution, 5 but it was included from the
American Convention on Human Rights.8 6 This closed an im-
84. Habeas corpus in Emergency Situations (Arts. 27(2), 25(1) and 7(6) American Con-
vention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 8, T
25 (Jan. 30, 1987). In paragraph 25, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights said that:
The States Parties not only have the obligation to recognize and to respect the rights
and freedoms of all persons, they also have the obligation to protect and ensure the
exercise of such rights and freedoms by means of the respective guarantees (Art. 1.1),
that is, through suitable measure that will in all circumstances ensure the effective-
ness of these rights and freedoms.
Id.
85. Constituci6n de la Repilblica de Costa Rica de 1949. Article 39 states:
No one shall be made to suffer a penalty except for a crime, unintentional tort or
misdemeanour punishable by previous law, and by virtue of a final judgment handed
down by a competent authority, after the defendant has been given an opportunity to
plead his defense, and upon the necessary proof of guilt...
Id.
86. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 8, Nov. 22, 1969, Ley 4534 del 23
de Febrero de 1970, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.
Article 8. Right to a Fair Trial
1. Every person has the right to a hearing, with due guarantees and within a reason-
able time, by a competent, independent, and impartial tribunal, previously estab-
lished by law, in the substantiation of any accusation of a criminal nature made
against him or for the determination of his rights and obligations of a civil, labor, fis-
cal, or any other nature.
2. Every person accused of a criminal offense has the right to be presumed innocent
so long as his guilt has not been proven according to law. During the proceedings,
every person is entitled, with full equality, to the following minimum guarantees:
a. the right of the accused to be assisted without charge by a translator or interpret-
er, if he does not understand or does not speak the language of the tribunal or court;
b. prior notification in detail to the accused of the charges against him;
c. adequate time and means for the preparation of his defense;
d. the right of the accused to defend himself personally or to be assisted by legal
counsel of his own choosing, and to communicate freely and privately with his coun-
sel;
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portant gap, because the American Convention held ensured the
existence of "the right to a simple and prompt recourse.., for the
protection against acts that violate ... fundamental rights recog-
nized by the constitution or law of the state concerned or by this
Convention... ,"87 Costa Rica moved to a system more compatible
with the American Convention on Human Rights, which, in the
mind of the legislators, was natural, as the Inter-American Court
of Human Rights resides in San Jos6, Costa Rica.
Today, human rights treaties are a part of the law of the land,
and reinforced by the Constitutional Chamber's jurisprudence.
These treaties include the International Conventions on the Elim-
ination of Forms of Discrimination, the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, and the Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, among others.
In the words of a former Costa Rican President, Dr. Jos6
Joaquin Trejos Fernandez, at the Inaugural speech of the Ameri-
can Conference of Human Rights, in the 1970's:
We know that in any field, absolute perfection is unattainable
in this world. But we are encouraged by the desire and the
will that in the coming years this new continent will be able
to show to the world the enforcement of legal instruments
that, transcending the conventional boundaries apply to
America in defense of a principle which is not subject to na-
tional constituencies. Every human being, as a creature made
in the image and likeness of God, is worthy of not only our re-
spect but of our love, our concern, our highest consideration.
And so our America also will show that being generous in this
e. the inalienable right to be assisted by counsel provided by the state, paid or not as
the domestic law provides, if the accused does not defend himself personally or en-
gage his own counsel within the time period established by law;
f. the right of the defense to examine witnesses present in the court and to obtain the
appearance, as witnesses, of experts or other persons who may throw light on the
facts;
g. the right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself or to plead guilty; and
h. the right to appeal the judgment to a higher court.
3. A confession of guilt by the accused shall be valid only if it is made without coer-
cion of any kind.
4. An accused person acquitted by a nonappealable judgment shall not be subjected to
a new trial for the same cause.
5. Criminal proceedings shall be public, except insofar as may be necessary to protect
the interests of justice.
Id.
87. Id. at art. 25.
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respect and this love, it will be ourselves, -and our family and
the society we live in- the first beneficiaries of achieving peace
and development.88
3. Standing
Article 33 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction estab-
lishes that "[a]ny person may file for a writ of amparo."8 9 The
phrase "[a]ny person" was construed to stand for the person ag-
grieved, or anyone who may file the petition in his or her favor.90
The writ of amparo's purpose is to protect the individual and so-
cial rights of a concrete and individualized person or persons. It
would not be possible to file a writ in favor of undetermined per-
sons or groups of persons, such as to protect all citizens of a cer-
tain nationality living in Costa Rica. 91 There is an exception to
this rule when a plaintiff claims the infraction of environmental
rights. In such a case the breach impacts all inhabitants and
standing is derived directly from the constitution.92
The Constitutional Chamber has created a presumption, such
that any individual filing a petition in favor of another is pre-
sumed to have the latter's will and knowledge to file the writ.93
However, because the constitutional rights are a private matter to
the individual, his unwillingness to continue with the amparo
would be enough to dismiss the case.94
As in habeas corpus, powers of attorney are unnecessary in the-
se proceedings.
Minors and corporations may file a petition for the writ of am-
paro in order to protect a particular individual or to foster self-
related constitutional interests.
The Constitutional jurisdiction also bars the judicial review of
statutory legislation and judicial decisions, or the electoral maters
from the amparo.95 However, Article 48 of the law allows the
88. HERMES NAVARRO DEL VALLE, LA CONVENCI6N AMERICANA SOBRE DERECHOS
HUMANOS Y LOS VOTOS DE LA SALA CONSTITUCIONAL DE COSTA RICA [THE AMERICAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF
COSTA RICA] 8 (Universidad Aut6noma de Centro Am6rica 1996).
89. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 33.
90. SCCSJ, Jan. 1, 1990, SCIJ No. 1990-00093 (Costa Rica).
91. SCCSJ, Apr. 17, 1991, SCIJ No. 1991-00746 (Costa Rica).
92. SCCSJ, Apr. 16, 1993, SCIJ No. 1993-01700 (Costa Rica).
93. SCCSJ, Sept. 07, 1994, SCIJ No. 1994-05086 (Costa Rica).
94. Id.
95. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 10 (amended 1989);
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 30.
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Chamber to advise the writ of amparo or habeas corpus petitioner
to seek redress through a claim of unconstitutionality, if the con-
stitutional infraction is being caused by a general provision of
law.96 The interested party must then move to file these proce-
dures, within fifteen days. 97 Failure to do so will stall the case
and result in its dismissal.
98
4. Ripeness
Article 35 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction states
that:
The writ of amparo may be filed at any time as long as the vi-
olation, threat, disruption or restriction endures, and until
two months after they have completely ceased its direct ef-
fects on the victim. However, in the case of purely property
rights or other rights whose violation can be validly allowed,
the appeal must be filed within two months from the date the
injured party was reliably informed of the violation and was
legally able to file the writ.99
This provision of Article 35 imposes a statute of limitation solely
for the violation of substantial rights that involve or relate to
property, thus it is possible to waive such constitutional rights.
Furthermore, the Constitutional Chamber has construed this pro-
vision to hold the statute of limitations begins running only after
the violation of the fundamental right ceases.
5. Varieties or Distinguishable Forms of Amparo Claims
The Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction contains clearly dif-
ferentiated writs of protection against various entities in the fol-
lowing categories.
a. Against Public Authorities
The writs for protection against public authorities make up a
large percentage of the cases that are filed with the Constitutional
96. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 48
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 35.
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Chamber. They resolve all individual and social rights, the right
to petition and rights relating to healthcare, among others.
It is important to mention cases dealing with healthcare rights,
as they are a very special type of amparo. In practice, the Consti-
tutional Chamber examines these claims immediately, prior to
any other cases, except writs of habeas corpus. The Costa Rican
Social Security Agency (Caja Costarricense de Seguro Social) is
the most important agency in the health care system, and it is the
most important health care provider in Costa Rica. In fact, the
Caja employs over ninety percent of all registered doctors. 100 It is
financed by mandatory contributions from employees, employers,
and the state.
A number of people file cases with the Constitutional Chamber
to enforce their healthcare rights when they believe the govern-
ment healthcare system failed to provide medication, treatment,
or service, due to equipment failure. The Chamber consistently
dismisses the Caja's frequent excuses for not fulfilling patient de-
mands, often stating that its failures were due to budget limita-
tions or the fact that certain drugs are not included in the Official
Medicines List (LOM). Today, the court's long-affirmed jurispru-
dence will uphold a general practitioner's knowledge of the specific
patient's case or of the benefits of the medication he or she is pre-
scribing to the patient as enough to supersede any of the financial
policies that block prescription, treatment or other healthcare-
related claims. 10 1
b. Against Private Citizens
There are also writs of protection against private individuals or
entities. 0 2 This is an atypical procedure though, because there
are other legal remedies available in such situations. The circum-
stances and facts of a case must meet special requirements. The
plaintiff must have a difficult case where ordinary legal remedies
cannot provide protection. For example, if a landlord cuts all pub-
lic utilities to a tenant, such as electricity and water, leaving the
tenant in a precarious situation, an action for a writ of protection
100. Bruce M. Wilson, The Causes and Consequences of Health Rights Litigation in Cos-
ta Rica, HEALTH RIGHTS IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Alicia Yamin & Siri Gloppen eds.,
Harvard University Press 2011).
101. SCCSJ, Feb. 29, 2008, SCIJ, No. 2008-03069 (Costa Rica), SCCSJ, Sept. 18, 2007,
SCIJ, No. 2007-13553 (Costa Rica), or SCCSJ, May 24, 2006, SCIJ, No. 2006-07291 (Costa
Rica).
102. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 57.
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may be available. Another example in which such a writ would be
available would be in a situation in which public or private land is
being used inappropriately by a neighbor or any other individual,
causing environmental damage.
c. Against The Media
The writ of amparo on rectification and response is directed
against the mass media, providing protection for anyone injured
by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas disseminated to the
public in general. 10 3 This is a two level procedure. 10 4 First, the
aggrieved person has the right to reply using the same mode of
communication, as that used for the transmission of the incorrect
information. The petition must be in writing and presented to the
daily media after five days of the publication. 105 If the daily media
accepts the rectification, it must do so within three days, or in oth-
er cases where the media is not released daily, such as a periodi-
cal, that media must accept rectification in the next edition.
10 6
Second, if the petition to reply is denied, 10 7 the Constitutional
Chamber will quickly decide the matter within three days, includ-
ing any questions related to the text of the publication.
08
III. QUESTIONS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
Through these procedures, the Law of the Constitutional Juris-
diction combines cases based on an abstract form of defense of the
103. Id. at art. 66. It is important to note that Chapter III of the Law of the Constitu-
tional Jurisdiction rules this form of amparo as the result of an international obligations
acquired by Costa Rica when ratifying the American Convention of Human Rights. Moreo-
ver the Costa Rican Government requested an advisory opinion to the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights on the scope and meaning of "law" in article 14.1 of the Convention.
See Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1(1) and 2 American
Convention on Human Rights). Advisory Opinion OC-7186, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No.
7, decree C (Aug. 29, 1986) said:
C. That the word "law," as it is used in Article 14(1), is related to the obligations as-
sumed by the States Parties in Article 2 and that, therefore, the measures that the
State Party must adopt include all such domestic measures as may be necessary, ac-
cording to the legal system of the State Party concerned, to ensure the free and full
exercise of the right recognized in Article 14(i). However, if any such measures im-
pose restrictions on a right recognized by the Convention, they would have to be
adopted in the form of a law.
104. Id. at art. 69.
105. Id. at art. 69(a).
106. Id. at art. 69(b).
107. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 69(c).
108. Id. at art. 69(ch) - (d).
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constitutional order when public authorities exercise their consti-
tutional and legal attributes, and also provides an avenue for pub-
lic officials to assert their relationship when conflicting with other
entities and branches of government. Notwithstanding this ab-
stract form of judicial review, there are also other mechanisms,
not only to defend structural constitutional provisions, but also to
adjudicate legislation and other acts of public authorities, mainly
to ascertain individual rights embodied in the constitution.
A. The Action of Unconstitutionality
Article 10 of the constitution embodies the remedy to defend the
constitutional order and also to protect individual freedoms. 10 9 In
fact, the action of unconstitutionality is currently a very important
instrument available to the ordinary citizen to challenge certain
policies and legislation on constitutional grounds in a pending
case lodged at the administrative or judicial instance. An action of
unconstitutionality can even be argued in certain cases if the in-
jured party cannot directly demonstrate a private interest in the
case.
Notwithstanding the importance of actions of unconstitutionali-
ty, the structure of the system of constitutional controls in Costa
Rica maintains the writs of habeas corpus and amparo as a pref-
erential remedy over the judicial review of statutes.
1. Origins
Constitutional control of legislation can be traced back to the
early constitutional document, the Cadiz Constitution, which gov-
erned Spain and the colonial Americas. 110 Although it held many
interesting principles, it was more concerned with a political con-
trol system of constitutional supremacy than a system of judicial
review. It was the product of the strong influence from the French
Revolution, where the control over constitutional supremacy re-
sided in the political bodies of government.
Most subsequent Costa Rican constitutions granted preemi-
nence to the legislative body over the control of constitutional in-
109. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPfPBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 10 (1989).
110. LA JURISDICcION CONSTITUCIONAL supra note 61, at 173. See also BARKER, supra
note 4, at 38.
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fractions.111 The constitutional framers of many of the country's
fundamental documents frequently followed the Cadiz Constitu-
tion's political guidelines. These documents prevailed more than a
century before a well-organized constitution assembled a jurisdic-
tional control system of constitutional supremacy. It is, therefore,
common to find a rule in which the political body is required to
review the constitutionality of its own legislation in its first ses-
sions, and solve any violations that derived from it.112
Costa Rican scholars have divided the early history of the devel-
opment of the system of constitutional control into two periods.
13
The first period was from 1812 to 1887, in which the Constitution
of the United States had a direct impact on the Costa Rican con-
stitutional documents, 114 through the Central American Federa-
tion.'15 The Central American framers' reception of the document
was imprecise. This was an unfortunate constitutional moment
for Costa Rica and the other Central American states, because it
misplaced the resolution of constitutional issues in the political
bodies of the federation, which had a negative effect on the at-
tempt to form a real system of constitutional control.
Other subsequent constitutions followed, until an important
provision was promulgated in the 1869 constitution. The political
control over the supremacy of the constitution was still vested in
the Legislative Assembly at that time, but required some degree of
111. Jorge Francisco Sdenz Carbonell et al., Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad
[The Origins of Constitutional Control], 1 REVISTA DE DERECHO CONSTITUCIONAL
[CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW], Enero-Abril 1991 at 29.
112. Id. at 30. The author cites Article 373 of the Cadiz Constitution that asserted "[/]as
Cortes en sus primeras sesiones tomardn en consideraci6n las infracciones de la Constitu-
ci6n que se les hubieran hecho presentes, para poner el conveniente remedio y hacer efectiva
la responsabilidad de los que hubieren contravenido a ella." ['The parliaments in its first
sessions shall take into consideration the Constitutional breaches that have been made
present, in order to establish the convenient remedy and make effective the responsibility
of those whom have breached her."] Id.
113. Id. at 29.
114. Id. at 31.
115. JORGE FRANCISCO SAENZ CARBONELL, EL DESPERTAR CONSTITUCIONAL DE COSTA
RICA [THE CONSTITUTIONAL AWAKENING OF COSTA RICA] 239, 240, 273-74 (Libro Libre,
1985). After the Central American countries obtained their independence from Spain in
1821, they briefly formed part of the Mexican Empire. Id at 239. However, on June 30,
1823 the representatives of Honduras, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Guatemala
(acting as the head of the Central American countries) declared null and void the Union
with the Mexican Empire. Id. at 240. From thereon, these five nations organized them-
selves in a Federal State September 1st, 1825. Id. at 273. This gave birth to the Central
American Federation, it however was plagued since its inception with many structural
problems between the Federal Government and the States, which ultimately determined
Costa Rica's suspension from April 13, 1829 to February 11, 1831 when it was instituted
again until its final decay in November 14, 1838. Id. at 273-74.
270 Vol. 49
Spring 2011 Costa Rican Constitutional Jurisdiction
coordination between the legislative branch and the judicial
branch. The Supreme Court had a consultative function, but the
final decision still remained with the legislative branch.
116
Article 135 of that Constitution stated:
The Supreme Court may suspend by an absolute majority of
votes the enforcement of the laws, if a motion of the prosecu-
tor or any citizen alleges them to be contrary to the Constitu-
tion, it shall submit the question to Congress, where at its
next regular meeting its comments shall be taken into ac-
count, to decide definitely the appropriate matter. 11
7
The relevance of this provision relies on a novel concept: the
ability of an individual petitioner, rather than a political, govern-
ment official, to bring a grievance resulting from unconstitutional
laws before a court. In this sense, a form of judicial review was
first established in this constitution, but unfortunately there are
no records of its implementation in its brief constitutional exist-
ence. According to one author, this was a consequence of the nine-
teenth century philosophy upholding a strict division of powers. 118
If it was implemented, this rule would have provided a major
change, because the constitutional control of legislation would fi-
nally shift from the political body to the judicial branch of gov-
ernment.
The 1871 Constitution followed, but it returned once more to the
ancient approach, in which the political body reviewed the consti-
tutionality of legislation. During this constitutional period, how-
ever, ordinary legislation established a diffusive system of judicial
review.
A second period of judicial review began under the 1871 consti-
tution, 119 which was enacted as the Organic Law of the Courts in
1887120 and was in force at the beginning of 1888. Its provisions
116. Piza Escalante, supra note 5, at 9.
117. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1869 art. 135. See also
PERALTA, supra note 34, at 455.
118. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 39.
119. PERALTA, supra note 34, at 595. Artice 137 indicates that: "El Congreso en sus
primeras sesiones ordinarias observard si la Constituci6n ha sido infringida, y si se ha
hecho efectiva la responsabilidad de los infractores, para proveer en consecuencia lo conve-
niente." [The Congress in its first ordinary sessions shall observe whether the Constitution
has been breached, and if the liability has been effective against the trespasser, in order to
provide for the convenient consequences."] Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad,
supra note 111, at 39.
120. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 40. Article 8 indica-
tes: "No podrAn los funcionarios del orden judicial: 1.- Aplicar leyes, decretos o acuerdos
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created a diffuse system of judicial review, in which all courts
were banned from applying laws, decrees, or other governmental
agreements that were in conflict with the constitution. Any deci-
sion-making process from the court was inter-partes.
121
These provisions challenged the most profound traditional pow-
ers known to the legislative assembly; however, they were never
directly contested. The operation of this diffusive system operated
smoothly in its beginnings, 122 but as it will be explained caused
many problems, especially for the Supreme Court of Justice as the
high court's decisions were not considered binding upon lower
courts. 123
Additional problems arose after a coup in 1917. The 1871 con-
stitution was suspended for several years, but reinstated by Con-
gress in 1919; therefore many of the past governmental acts were
annulled. Although several cases were brought before the highest
court, its doctrine evolved conservatively, and all claims filed on
constitutional grounds were resolved by declaring the impugned
law constitutional. 124 Otherwise the court would not consider it
under the constitutional realm.
In the 1930's several justices that were uneasy with the diffu-
sive system of judicial review began to pursue amendments to
eliminate the system underlying these bills. The rationale, how-
ever, remained the same, meaning that an excessive respect for
the executive and legislative branches of government was still
present. Some judges would call this "the greatness of the law."'
125
Consequently, for the law to be repugnant to the constitution, it
had to be clearly contrary to its spirit and text. A law could be
gubernativos que sean contrarios a la Constituci6n." [Public officials of the judicial order
cannot: 1.- Apply law, decrees or gobernmental agreements that are contrary to the Consti-
tution.]. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 40.
121. As indicated supra, inter partes means between the parties involved in the case.
122. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 44.
123. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 44, 56. The author
explains that the civil law system in Costa Rica prevented that the jurisprudence to be
binding: "The fact that the courts, including at the level of Cassation, considered a regula-
tion unconstitutional, would not make it disappear from the legal order." Origenes del
Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 44.
124. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 57-61. The author
analyzes the case of Gdmez Braga v. el Estado, where notwithstanding the Cassation
Court's previous opinions on the constitutionality of the Law of Nullities, a lower Court
would consider it unconstitutional. The Cassation Court would set forth the presumption
of constitutionality of legislation. These cases were common to find as the jurisprudence
were not binding on the lower Courts. Saenz would also attribute other cases to follow the
same rule: Rojas Bennett v. el Estado, and Vargas v. Banco Interncional de Costa Rica.
Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 57-61.
125. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 63.
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found constitutional frequently by the court, even though it
breaches fundamental rights. The system was thus controlled by
the minorities in the Plenary Court, which required a high voting
requirement to repeal a law on constitutional grounds.
126
In 1937, the system was successfully amended to give the Ple-
nary Court the power to resolve constitutional questions through a
legal amendment. 127 This was, however, not to be done at the con-
stitutional level, because formally there still remained the provi-
sion under a similar Cadiz-like guidance. Furthermore, a law in
1944 further restricted the legal system and prohibited the court
from hearing constitutional challenges concerning a previously
contested law.1
28
The diffusive system of judicial review was thus amended to in-
corporate the legal system known to the Plenary Court that legit-
imatized unconstitutional rules of law. This was done through a
proposed bill, which included an amendment to Article 967 of the
Civil Procedure Code.129 The amendment established the two-
thirds voting requirement for the Plenary Court to declare a law
unconstitutional, as a way to avoid conflicts on policy questions.
1 30
It was planned this way to avoid conflicts among the different
branches of government and its agencies, as it was believed and
explained in the preparatory commission of the bill, that a simple
majority voting rule provided an avenue to many conflicts among
126. ANTONIO G. PIcADo, ExPLIcACI6N DE LAS REFORMAS A LA LEY ORGANICA DEL PODER
JUDICIAL [EXPLANATION OF THE REFORMS OF THE ORGANIC LAW OF THE JUDICIAL POWER]
419 (Imprenta nacional, 1st ed. 1937). The intent of the framers was to make it difficult to
strike down a law, decree, or executive agreement or resolution, only if two thirds of the
votes of the Plenary Court were obtained. Id.
127. Origenes del Control de Constitucionalidad, supra note 111, at 63.
128. GUTItRREZ, supra note 24, at 366. The author refers to Law number 183 of August
31, 1944, which amends Article 967 as it introduces the principle of res judicata to all cases
where constitutional questions have been dismissed. GUTItRREZ, supra note 24, at 366.
129. PICADO, supra note 126, at 417. The amendment also included many other Chap-
ters of the Civil Procedural Code.
Articulo 967.- Para que haya resoluci6n declarando la inaplicabilidad de la ley, decre-
to, acuerdo o disposici6n por ser contrarios a la Constituci6n, es indispensable que se
hayan pronunciado en ese sentido por lo menos los dos tecerios del total de los Magis-
trados. Si no alcanzare ese ndmero, se tendrdn por aplicables la ley, decreto, acuerdo
o resoluci6n y no podrdn presentarse ni serdn admisibles nuevas demandas de inapli-
cabilidad sobre el mismo punto. [In order to have a decision declaring the inapplica-
bility of a law, decree, agreement or provision held to be contrary to the Constitution,
it is essential to have the concurrence of at least no less than two thirds of the total of
Justices. If such a number shall not be reached, the law, decree, agreement or provi-
sion shall be applicable and from thereon it shall not be possible nor admissible to
have new actions of inapplicability concerning the same questions.]
PICADO, supra note 126, at 417.
130. PICADO, supra note 126, at 417.
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the political branches of government. 131 It is clear that this rule
was intended to provide deference to the laws and other general
provisions, until the new constitutional control system of 1989 was
put into force.
It is equally clear that a third period of judicial review began
under the 1949 constitution, after amendments were made in
1989. The amendments to the constitution and the creation of the
constitutional jurisdiction had important implications that
marked a dynamic period and began a legal revolution within all
areas of the Costa Rican legal system.
2. Freedoms and other Principles Protected
Today, the action of unconstitutionality empowers the Constitu-
tional Chamber with the competence to declare, by an absolute
majority vote of its members, the unconstitutionality of provisions
of any nature and acts subject to Public Law. 132 It has been de-
signed to challenge the policies embodied in ordinary or secondary
legislation of the political branches of government. Legislative
statutes and executive decrees can be contested for constitutional-
related infractions. 133 The judicial branch's administrative regula-
tions can also be challenged through this remedy. 34 The action of
unconstitutionality is an instrument to test and drive certain gov-
ernmental policies closer to constitutional standards. Not even
the judiciary or the Supreme Electoral Tribunal is excluded from
its jurisdiction with regards to the administrative functions.
131. LA JURISDICCI6N CONSTITUCIONAL, supra note 61, at 195.
132. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPtIBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949, art. 10 (1989).
133. Article 10 of the Constitution indicates:
A specialised Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice shall declare, by an absolute
majority vote of its members, the unconstitutionality of provisions of any nature and
acts subject to Public Law [ ... 1. Article 10 provides an ample or broad jurisdiction
that allows to discuss constitutional questions before the Constitutional Chamber
over diverse types of legislation: international law, statutes, secondary legislation
provided by the executive, legislative, judicial and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal
branches of government and their agencies.
Id.
134. Id. Article 10 of the Constitution indicates:
A specialised Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice shall declare, by an absolute
majority vote of its members, the unconstitutionality of provisions of any nature and
acts subject to Public Law. [... 1. It is a fundamental principle of administrative law
that all public acts, may that be for the general population or only affecting individu-
als, shall be governed by public law. Therefore, in all circumstances such acts of the
Executive, Legislative, Judicial branches and the Supreme Electoral Tribunal or
their respective agencies, are under the scope of the Constitutional Chamber's juris-
diction as they exercise the powers assigned to these administrative functions.
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Notwithstanding the ample and broad jurisdiction of the Consti-
tutional Chamber, jurisdictional acts of the judiciary and the dec-
laration of the elections by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal, and
any others established by law, are out of the reach of the constitu-
tional jurisdiction. 135 This last stipulation has not been applied by
the legislators, adding more restrictions to the Constitutional
Chamber.
The action of unconstitutionality protects all rights and duties
established in the constitution. 13 6 This remedy is important to
ascertain all human rights and other international law standards
within Costa Rica, when the infringement is caused by a statute
or other provision of law. Under very special circumstances, it
may be an instrument to impugn other types of general norms,
such as corporate constituencies.
To illustrate these powers of the Chamber, the Costa Rican gov-
ernment sought an Advisory Opinion before the Inter-American
135. Id. Article 10 of the Constitution indicates: "[...] The jurisdictional acts of the
Judicial Branch, the declaration of the elections by the Supreme Electoral Tribunal and
any other acts established by law cannot be challenged following this procedure. [...]"
CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPI2JBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949, art. 10 (1989).
136. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION arts. 1 and 73.
Article 1 reads as follows:
This law aims to regulate the constitutional jurisdiction, whose purpose is to ensure
the supremacy of constitutional norms and principles of international Law or Com-
munity legislation in the Republic, the uniform interpretation and application, and
the rights and freedoms enshrined in the Constitution or in international human
rights instruments in force in Costa Rica.
LAw OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 1.
Article 73 indicates:
The action of unconstitutionality proceeds: a) Against the laws and other general
provisions, even those arising from acts of private persons, who violate, by perfor-
mance or omission, some rule or constitutional principle. b) Against subjective acts of
public authorities, whenever they violate, by act or omission, some rule or constitu-
tional principle, if the writs of habeas corpus or amparo are not applicable. c) When
the law-making procedure or legislative agreements violate a substantial require-
ment or procedure provided for in the Constitution or, where appropriate, established
in the Rules of Order, Direction and Interior Discipline of the Legislative Assembly.
ch) When approving a constitutional amendment in violation of constitutional rules
of procedure. d) If a law or general provision violates Article 7, first paragraph, of the
Constitution, as to oppose a treaty or international agreement. e) When subscribing,
approving or ratifying international conventions or treaties, or when in substance or
in effect violates a provision or constitutional principle or, where appropriate, the
Rules of Order, Direction and Interior Discipline of the Legislative Assembly. In this
event, the decision shall be made only for purposes to interpret and apply those pro-
visions in harmony with the Constitution or, if it proves insurmountable contradic-
tion, to order not to apply with general effect and proceed to denounce the treaty. f)
Against the inertia, abstentions and omissions of public authorities.
LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION arts. 73.
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Court of Human Rights. 137 Based on a long legal tradition in Cos-
ta Rica, all members of a profession are grouped into legal entities
called Colegios, including journalists. The American Convention
on Human Rights, in conformity with the Inter-American Court
however, provides that everyone has the right to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas of all kinds. 138 In addition to the
American Convention, there are other constitutional provisions
that protect freedom of expression, although they are not as com-
prehensive. In the advisory opinion to the Costa Rican govern-
ment, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights decision OC-05-
85139 stated that domestic legislation requiring compulsory mem-
bership of journalists in a professional association violates the
Human Rights Treaty.
Many years later, a case relating to this matter came to the at-
tention of the Constitutional Chamber. 140 In its decision, the Con-
137. Compulsory membership in an Association prescribed by law for the practice of
journalism. American Convention on Human Rights, arts. 13 and 29, Nov. 22, 1969,
Ley 4534 del 23 de Febrero de 1970, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36.; Advisory Opinion OC-5/85,
Inter-Am Cr. H.R. 4 (Ser. A) No. 5, (Nov. 13, 1985). Paragraph fourteen of the opinion
states:
The Government agreed to present the request because the IAPA does not have
standing to do so under the terms of the Convention. Article 64 of the Convention
empowers only OAS Member States and, within their spheres of competence, the or-
gans listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the OAS, as amended by the Protocol of
Buenos Aires in 1967, to present requests for advisory opinions. In presenting its re-
quest, the Government indicated that laws similar to those involved in the instant
application exist in at least ten other countries of the hemisphere.
Id.
138. American Convention on Human Rights, art. 13, Nov. 22, 1969. This conven-
tion states: Article 13.1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expres-
sion. This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas
of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of
art, or through any other medium of one's choice. 2.- [...]. Id.
Paragraph 81 of the Inter-american Court decision indicates:
It follows from what has been said that a law licensing journalists, which does
not allow those who are not members of the "colegio" to practice journalism and
limits access to the "colegio" to university graduates who have specialized in
certain fields, is not compatible with the Convention. Such a law would contain
restrictions to freedom of expression that are not authorized by Article 13.2 of
the Convention and would consequently be in violation not only the right of
each individual to seek and impart information and ideas through any means of
his choice, but also the right of the public at large to receive information with-
out any interference.
Id. at 1 81.
139. Id.
140. SCCSJ, May 9, 1995, SCIJ No. 1995-02313 (Costa Rica). The Constitutional
Chamber speaking through Justice Solano Carrera, held that:
Ahora bien, si la Corte elogi6 el hecho de que Costa Rica acudiera en procura de su
opini6n, emitida hace diez ahros, resulta inexplicable lo que desde aquilla fecha ha se-
guido sucediendo en el pais en la materia decidida, puesto que las cosas han permane-
cido igual y la norma declarada incompatible en aqudlla ocasi6n, ha gozado de plena
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stitutional Chamber declared the article forcing journalists to be
members of the association before they could practice their trade
to be unconstitutional. 141  In its decision, the Constitutional
Chamber affirmed Articles 1 and 2 of the American Convention on
Human Rights, in which the countries, as parties to the Conven-
tion, not only have an obligation to respect the fundamental rights
expressed in the American Convention, but also have an obliga-
tion to protect those rights at the domestic level. 142 The Chamber
determined that international agreements on human rights bind
the country as a whole. 143 Consequently, the judiciary, as part of
vigencia durante el tiempo que ha transcurrido hasta la fecha de esta sentencia. Eso
llama a la reflexidn, porque para darle una l6gica al sistema, ya en la Parte I, la Con-
vencidn establece dentro de los deberes de los Estados, respetar los derechos y liberta-
des reconocidos en ella y garantizar su libre y pleno ejercicio (articulo 2). [Neverthe-
less, if the Court praised the fact that Costa Rica sought this opinion, issued ten
years ago, it is inexplicable that things continue the same in the country in a
decided matter, and the ruling that found inconsistent the provision in that oc-
casion, has had full effect during the time that has elapsed until the date of this
decision. This calls for reflection, because to grant logic to the system, in Part I
of the Convention established within the duties of States, the respect to the





143. Id. The decision indicates that:
Se hace mds que notorio que la Sala Constitucional no solamente declara violaciones
a derechos constitucionales, sino a todo el universo de derechos fundamentales conte-
nidos en los instrumentos internacionales de derechos humanos vigentes en el pais.
Desde ese punto de vista, el reconocimiento por la Sala Constitucional de la normati-
va de la Convenci6n Americana de Derechos Humanos, en la forma en que la inter-
pret6 la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en su Opini6n Consultiva OC-
05-85, resulta natural y absolutamente consecuente con su amplia competencia. De
tal manera, sin necesidad de un pronunciamiento duplicado, fundado en los mismos
argumentos de esa opini6n, la Sala estima que es claro para Costa Rica que la norma-
tiva de la Ley N' 4420, en cuanto se refiere a lo aquf discutido por el sefior ROGER
AJUN BLANCO, es ilegitima y atenta contra el derecho a la informaci6n, en el am-
plio sentido que lo desarrolla el articulo 13 del Pacto de San Jos6 de Costa Rica, tanto
como de los articulos 28 y 29 de la Constituci6n Politica.
[It is more noticeable that the Constitutional Chamber not only declares constitu-
tional rights breaches, but the entire universe of basic rights contained in the inter-
national human rights instruments in force in the country. From this point of view,
the recognition by the Constitutional Chamber of the rules of the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
in its Advisory Opinion OC-05-85, results natural and consistent with its wide com-
petence. Thus, without requiring to duplicate the reasoning, based on the same ar-
guments to this view, the Chamber considers that it is clear for Costa Rica that the
rules of the Law No. 4420, as referred to herein discussed by Mr. Roger Ajun Blanco,
is unlawful and violates the right to information, in the broad sense that it is imple-
mented in article 13 of the Pact of San Jos6 de Costa Rica, as well as articles 28 and
29 of the Constitution.]
SCCSJ, May 9, 1995, SCIJ No. 1995-02313 (Costa Rica).
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the country, must construct and interpret domestic legislation to
ensure that it does not violate international obligations, even if
the other branches of government fail to fulfill them. In this way,
basing its rationale on an Inter-American Court decision, the Con-
stitutional Chamber declared the provision that excluded non-
journalists from seeking, receiving, and imparting information
and ideas of all kinds to be unconstitutional, 144
The constitution, human rights treaties, and other international
instruments that are applicable to Costa Rica are frequently en-
forced by the Constitutional Chamber. Therefore, it is important
for today's legislators to be extremely aware of the Constitutional
Chamber's opinions interpreting the constitution. In this way,
sharing this power has had a tremendous impact on the relation-
ship between the Legislative Assembly and the Constitutional
Chamber.
3. Standing
Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction provides
two basic ways to access the Constitutional Chamber.145 It pro-
vides for both indirect and direct forms of standing to contest a
statute or other general provisions of law. Indirect standing fol-
lows the Costa Rican second period of the constitutional control
system development, which begins with the Civil Procedure Code
rather than the European direct form of access. During discussion
of the jurisdictional law, the records of the bill reveal very few ex-
cerpts on standing as an avenue to access the Constitutional Ju-
risdiction either directly or indirectly.146
a. Indirect Standing
A Constitutional Chamber decision may be reached during dis-
cussion of a pending case at any administrative or judicial pro-
ceeding. Before seeking protection, the interested party must in-
voke the constitutional rule or principle being breached by a pro-
144. Id.
145. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 75.
146. Fernando Castillo Viquez & Giulio Sansonetti H., Ley de la Jurisdicci6n Constituci-
onal [The Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction] (undated document) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with the Procuraduria General de la Reptiblica).
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vision of law. 147 This requirement was included to facilitate the
improvement of the legal system. It avoids time consuming, mul-
tiple, and costly judicial proceedings before the courts and guaran-
tees that the constitutional questions are brought up at an early
stage of the controversy. Moreover, any administrative procedure
can be brought free of cost, without the need of a lawyer before the
Public Administration. This is similar to the writs of amparo and
habeas corpus. In this sense, the system was structured to guar-
antee openness of the jurisdiction while discussing any case, and
to allow collateral attacks to unconstitutional legislation.
The action of unconstitutionality must be brought in the course
of an administrative or judicial proceeding, or in a habeas corpus
or amparo claim.148 It must be filed before the final decisions are
rendered in the case. 149 It is an indirect approach to the constitu-
tional jurisdiction, because the plaintiff must plead a constitution-
al breach in the case ahead of time and show that an action of un-
constitutionality is a reasonable means to provide protection.
50
As a consequence, it is unnecessary for the Administration or
judge to actually settle the constitutional petition. The plaintiff,
however, then has the burden to file the case at the constitutional
jurisdiction, before it is definitively resolved, since the Constitu-
tional Chamber will have jurisdiction to decide the case as long as
it is pending subject matter.' 5 ' According to long standing prece-
dents, this indirect standing is the general rule used to admit ac-
tions of unconstitutionality, but there are exemptions.
52
147. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art 75. The first paragraph of the
article indicates that:
Para interponer la accidn de inconstitutionalidad es necesario que exista un asunto
pendiente de resolver ante los tribunals, inclusive de hdbeas corpus o de amparo, o en
el procedimiento para agotar la via administrativa, en que se invoque esa inconstitu-
cionalidad como medio razonable de amparar el derecho o intergs que se considera le-
sionado. [To file for an action of unconstitutionality is necessary to have a case pend-
ing resolution before the courts, including the writ habeas corpus or amparo, or the
procedure for exhaustion of administrative remedies, within which the constitutional




149. Id. at art. 77.
150. SCCSJ, Mar. 1, 1994, SCIJ No. 1994-01156 (Costa Rica); SCCSJ, Aug. 20, 1996,
SCIJ No. 1996-04208 (Costa Rica); SCCSJ, March 4, 1997, SCIJ No. 1997-1319 (Costa
Rica); and SCCSJ, Aug. 16, 2000, SCIJ No. 2000-07158 (Costa Rica).
151. SCCSJ, Jan. 3, 1991, SCIJ No. 1991-00493 (Costa Rica).




Article 75 of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction also al-
lows pursuing the unconstitutionality of legislation and other pro-
visions of law through a direct and abstract form of litigation. 153
Consequently, a pending case is not needed. The legal require-
ments are still assembled to structure a more technical remedy
than the amparo and habeas corpus, but this procedure enjoys
much of the original design, which loosens standing requirements.
This procedure was intended to fix constitutional justice and to
alter it into an accessible public service, providing avenues for an-
yone to be a real party in interest and for a broader category of
individuals to have the capacity to sue if he or she shows standing
under the included categories. There are a few significant legal
requirements, including the authentication of the petition for legal
representation, a clear and precise explanation of the constitu-
tional breach, and representation before the Court in a public
hearing, if decreed. 154 These requirements apply to both the indi-
rect and direct forms of standing.
The Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction surpasses the classi-
cal divisions of private and public interests, and regulates the col-
lective interests in Costa Rica. Hence, the inhabitants of the re-
public have direct standing to bring claims for the protection of
legitimate, individual interests related to basic rights and free-
doms. The Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction can protect the
constitutional attributes of public authorities and the collective
interests, as long as the protection of extensive constitutional
standards is at stake. The procedures are regulated to repair crit-
ical, collective interests which may be allocated in the recognition
of rights for groups that wish to protect such interests.155
In order to bring a case before the Constitutional Chamber, the
Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction does not require predeter-
mined number of plaintiffs. Nor is there a need to demonstrate
special common interests for any type of certification by the court.
Any person can instead assert the defense of any legitimate collec-
tive interest. In short, there is no need for the individual to create
a group to obtain a legal remedy. The interaction of the members
around a specific constitutional end will suffice. Common ground
153. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 75.
154. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION arts. 10, 78 and 79.
155. ERNESTO JINESTA LOBO, TRATADO DE DERECHO ADMINISTRATVO [ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE] 221-226 (Editorial Juridica Continental, ed., 2nd ed. 2009).
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for these groups may include any socially relevant point of view,
as long as they share a common characteristic that binds them to
a specific constitutional right. Under these circumstances, indi-
viduals may suffer damages individually. At the same time, the
loss will also be deemed as injuring the group as a whole.
Therefore, it is possible to bring a constitutional question on the
following cases:
- When laws and other general provisions of law do not cause
a direct and individual infraction; 156 as the nature of the con-
stitutional breach (injury) cannot be allocated in any public or
private individual or group of individuals. In these cases, the
loss or damage inflicted by the legislation could rarely be at-
tacked indirectly.157 Therefore, it is possible to challenge legis-
lation directly by demonstrating the need to use these
grounds to take the action. The Constitutional Chamber can
use a great deal of discretionary powers in these circumstanc-
es. For example, the court has granted municipalities this
category of standing to access the constitutional jurisdic-
tion.158
• The Constitutional Chamber has construed another type of
collective interest among legal entities (or their constituency,
associations or foundations): not-for-profit or commercial legal
entities that enhance shareholders' constitutional rights and
interests, etc. 159 In this sense, the Constitutional Chamber
recognizes the authority of corporative interests to exercise
the protection of its members. 60 The damage caused by the
unconstitutional provision can be allocated to an individual
member being entitled to impugn the law individually, or
through the legal entity that groups all members that are
sharing the same constitutional complaint.
161
- Diffusible interests allow a special standing to challenge
legislation that infringes widely, scattered and extended con-
156. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 75, 2.
157. SCCSJ, May 23, 1995, SCIJ 1995-02621 (Costa Rica).
158. SCCSJ, May 16, 2007, SCIJ 2007-06612 (Costa Rica).
159. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 222. The author explains the corporative interest
as a species of the collective interests, but related to organized and legal moral entities.
JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 222.
160. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 222. The author cites the jurisprudence of the
Constitutional Chamber in the subject matter. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 154, at 222.
161. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 222.
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stitutionally protected interests among the Costa Rican popu-
lation. These types of interests reflect a type of collective in-
terest (as the collectivity represents the entire Costa Rican
population), distributed among smaller groups of individuals
sharing a common interest.162 It shares in common the collec-
tive interests that any individual may petition in his own fa-
vor and of those that are harmed among his category, class, or
group. 163 This is true as the group shares the characteristics
of the collective interests, in the sense that the individuals
may be singled out, considered individually, but anyone in his
category, class, or group has the same standing as the rest of
the members. 164 There is no need for them to be legally orga-
nized.1 65 Any person may be entitled to file a constitutional
question as long as they claim these less extended diffusible
rights and many times are less resourceful.
1 66
Among all these interests that are widely allocated and distin-
guishable at a broader level, the most common examples used for
standing are environmental rights, control over public funds or
expenditures, consumer rights, and issues relating to cultural and
world heritage.
However, the Constitutional Chamber has narrowly construed
Article 75 of the Constitutional Jurisdiction to deny popular action
and to consider a pending case under the general rule on stand-
ing.167 Therefore, if a piece of legislation at odds with the constitu-
tion does not fall under the Chamber's categories of collective in-
terests, then this abstract and direct form of litigation will be de-
nied unless the person expressing the complaint considers bring-
ing the case under the constitutional control system through indi-
rect standing.
Finally, similar to the European countries, the law allows the
head of specific governmental entities to have direct standing,
162. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 225.
163. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 225.
164. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 225. Ernesto Jinesta cites the Constitutional
Chamber's case law, that explains this complex form of standing, in this sense it is relevant
the decision 1999-00360 of the Constitutional Chamber, as it describes the diffusible inter-
est as a way to defend certain constitutional rights of singular relevance for the adequate
and harmonious development of society. See SCCSJ, Jan. 20, 1999, SCIJ, No. 1999-00360
(Costa Rica).
165. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 224.
166. JINESTA LOBO, supra note 155, at 224.
167. See SCCSJ, Feb. 06, 2008, SCIJ, No. 2008-001731(Costa Rica); SCCSJ, Apr. 23,
2008, SCIJ, No. 2008-06803 (Costa Rica); and SCCSJ, Apr. 25, 2008, SCIJ, No. 2008-6865
(Costa Rica).
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such as the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Procurator




The requirement of a pending case is only necessary when the
petitioner is challenging a law with indirect standing. At the ad-
ministrative level, the window to challenge any rule of law begins
after the filing of remedies to exhaust the administrative jurisdic-
tion.169 A similar rationale is applicable to the judicial cases, be-
fore any final and conclusive decision is entered in the case.
Hence, it would not be possible to challenge a general provision of
law on constitutional grounds in a case where it has already been
applied, or finally resolved, due to the res judicata rule.
It is even possible to challenge legislation if it has been re-
pealed, as long as there are unconstitutional consequences still
standing and in force. If the statute or general provision of law
has been invalidated, reformed, or abolished by the responsible
public authority, the action of unconstitutionality would be inad-
missible, unless the effects of such legislation survive and cause
damage to specific individuals.
170
B. The Advisory Jurisdiction
This type of constitutional control system is entirely new for the
Costa Rican legal system. Section (b) of Article 10 of the Constitu-
tion provides for a preventive jurisdiction, to control the approval
of constitutional amendments, the incorporation of international
law prior to their legislative approval (constitutional requirement
for the final ratification by the executive power), and to draft legis-
lation. 171
Before 1989, the constitution did not have a judicial body to
render an advisory opinion to the Legislative Assembly. The fore-
fathers did, however, establish a formal constitutional consulta-
tion 72 for very specific circumstances. This consultation pre-
168. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 75 T 3.
169. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 75 T 1.
170. SCCSJ, Mar. 2, 2011, SCIJ, 2011-02699 (Costa Rica) and SCCSJ, Oct. 21, 2009,
SCIJ, 2009-16300 (Costa Rica).
171. CONSTITucI6N DE LA REPIBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949, art. 10, § b (1989).
172. Fernando Castillo Viquez et al, La Consulta Constitucional y la Consulta de Consti-
tucionalidad [The Constitutional Consultation and the Constitutional Advisory Jurisdic-
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scribed the constitutional obligation to have a hearing for certain
institutions when bills targeted matters under their jurisdiction.
Examples include the universities; the Supreme Electoral Tribu-
nal when the regulation would affect electoral matters; the Cen-
tral Bank if the regulation regarded the determination of the law
of the unit of currency; the judicial branch when the regulation
regarded its organization or functioning; and, finally, any autono-
mous institution when the discussion and approval of bills affected
its institutional legal framework.
The original proposition to amend the prior Article 10 of the
constitution was rather simple. In fact, it did not include the ad-
visory jurisdiction, the competence to settle conflicts of jurisdiction
between the branches of government, the Supreme Electoral Tri-
bunal, or any other entities or bodies established by law. This was
the result of a motion modifying the bill to add two sections to Ar-
ticle 10 before the proposed amendment reached the consultation
before the Supreme Court of Justice.
Once approved by the legislators, the advisory jurisdiction cre-
ated a form of constitutional justice that provides for a two-fold
system consisting of mandatory and optional procedures to review
draft legislation on constitutional grounds before it is approved
and enacted by the Legislative Assembly. 173 An opinion is only
binding when the Chamber reviews procedural matters prescribed
by the constitution and regulations ruling on legislative proce-
dures. It has, however, been a long standing practice that the
opinion will include questions that may be relevant from a consti-
tutional point of view, rendered in the form of advice to the legis-
lators before the final approval of the legislation. For the case of
optional advisory opinions, the Chamber will only decide those
questions raised by the legislators. Nevertheless, these opinions
do not preclude further litigation rights that could emerge from
the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.
1 74
1. Mandatory Advisory Opinions before the Legislature
The Mandatory Advisory Opinions address procedural questions
relating to drafts of constitutional amendments, international leg-
islation, or amendments to the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdic-
tion] 1 Revista de Derecho Constitucional [Constitutional Law Review] Enero-Abril 1991 at
119.
173. CONSTITUcION DE LA REPOBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949, art. 10, § b (1989); LAW OF
THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 96.
174. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 101 3.
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tion.175 Constitutional amendments must be subject to approval
only after two or more debates and different legislative periods,
176
because they require more complex and rigid procedures than or-
dinary legislation and treaties that only require two debates for
final approval.
177
The Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction mandates that once
the draft legislation is approved in the first debate, the Legislative
Governing Council must submit the records to the Constitutional
Chamber.178 The Constitutional Chamber must then render its
opinion within one month.
179
2. The Optional Advisory Opinions on Draft Legislation
In general, few details are available in the legislative records
showing how the advisory opinions were introduced in the bill to
amend Article 10 of the constitution in 1989. However, some ex-
perts' documents reveal reliable information 18 0 on the precise ori-
gins of these procedures. Article 10 not only created the jurisdic-
tion to hear consultations on constitutional amendments, ratifica-
tion of treaties and other legislation, but it also opened the way for
future legal development.
The historical background of the Advisory Jurisdiction is diffi-
cult to understand, because the Law of the Constitutional Juris-
diction was the result of contributions from many sources, making
it difficult to understand individual articles.' 18 Nevertheless, it is
possible to conclude that the European models of constitutional
justice played an important role in creating the advisory jurisdic-
tion in the constitution and the jurisdictional law. Specifically,
the Costa Rican forefathers were inspired by the enduring,
French, strict division of powers that only regulate preventive
mechanisms of a constitutional control system, Kelsen's ideas of
constitutional justice in Austria, and Spain's jurisdictional regula-
tions.182
175. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 96 § a.
176. Constituci6n de la Repdblica de Costa Rica de 1949, art. 195 (1989).
177. Id. at art. 124.
178. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 98.
179. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 101.
180. Viquez, supra note 146; LUIS FERNANDO SOLANO, LA CONSULTA LEGISLATIVA DE
CONSTITUCIONALIDAD EN COSTA RICA, 6-7 (Ivstitia No. 69 1992).
181. Viquez, supra note 146.
182. There were many important jurists involved in the 1989 constitutional and legal
reforms, from different public and private sectors of Costa Rica. Eduardo Ortiz Ortiz, pres-
tigious private lawyer; Rodolfo Piza Escalante, private lawyer and former Congressman
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According to Justice Solano Carrera, the Advisory jurisdiction
was designed after France's Conseil D'Etat that inspired the
Spanish, the Portuguese and the Colombian system of Optional
Advisory Opinions.183 He indicated that the Conseil D'Etat provid-
ed many examples of excellence and provident courses of action
when deciding questions submitted to its advisory jurisdiction.
1 8 4
Therefore, the advisory opinions were established to make consti-
tutionality a priority. As a result, future legislation could then be
enacted in conformity with the text, values, and principles of the
constitution.
The Costa Rican Advisory Jurisdiction was designed for minori-
ties and took the lead from the Spanish system on standing, allow-
ing one-fifth of the members of parliament to seek consultation.
18 5
For Costa Rica, ten out of fifty-seven legislators is required to re-
quest an Optional Advisory Opinion before the Constitutional
Chamber.186
The 1989 discussions highlight the usefulness of the opinion of a
specialized judicial body on constitutional law, but a minority
voiced concern over the decision to allow an advisory opinion on
ordinary legislation, believing this to be a controversial legal in-
strument. 8 7 It is clear that at that time, Spain had already
amended its preventive constitutional control system, which it did
in 1985, eliminating the advisory opinion from its legal system. It
did so because of the unfortunate political and constitutional is-
sues that it experienced, and left only the exception for the ap-
proval of international legislation. 88 Today, it is clear that these
procedures are frequently used as a political instrument, not only
to help ensure the constitutionality of future legislation, but also
for political purposes.
and President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights; Ruben Hernandez Valle pres-
tigious constitutional private lawyer; Luis Paulino Mora Mora, former Justice and at the
time Minister of Justice; Luis Fernando Solano Carrera, General Procurator of the Repub-
lic, and other members of the legislative commission called to approve the legal versions
that would reach the Legislative Assembly floor.
183. SOLANO, supra note 180, at 6-7.
184. SOLANO, supra note 180, at 6-7.
185. SOLANO, supra note 180, at 11.
186. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 98 § b; CONSTITUCI6N DE LA
REPUBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949, art. 106 (amended 1961). The Constitution ensembles
the Costa Rican Legislative Assembly with fifty-seven representatives, and the Jurisdic-
tional Law establishes the minimum number for them to petition for an advisory jurisdic-
tion before the Constitutional Chamber. Id.
187. Viquez, supra note 146.
188. FRANcISCO CAAMAIfO DOMINGUEZ, JURISDICCI)N Y PROCESOS CONSTITUCIONALES
[CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES] 22 (McGraw-Hill eds., 1st ed. 1997).
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It is possible that the Opposition Parties will use the Advisory
Opinion to move forward with their political agendas. In fact, it is
often contended that the Advisory Opinion is often used as lever-
age to end a dispute and to reach a political agreement.18 9 Never-
theless, this might be true in some cases, but not always. An anal-
ysis of the different advisory opinions (mandatory and optional)
from the years 1989 to 2007 reveals that the Constitutional
Chamber's involvement in the legislative process to be positive. 190
It analyzed a total of 525 cases, where 60 % were mandatory and
38% were optional. 191 This fact easily rules out that the optional
advisory opinion could be used to filibuster the legislative proce-
dures. 192 Moreover, 24% of the mandatory advisory opinions of the
Constitutional Chamber were found with constitutional problems,
62% did not. 193 For optional advisory opinions 43% found breach-
es in the procedure or to the fundamental rights, therefore pre-
venting the enactment of legislation with expensive repercussions
due to important constitutional breaches. 1
94
Like in Spain, specific institutions in Costa Rica also have
standing to seek an advisory opinion, which is in addition to legis-
lators discussed above. In Costa Rica, legislation provides stand-
ing to the Supreme Court of Justice, the Supreme Electoral Tribu-
nal, the Comptroller General of the Republic concerning constitu-
tional issues, and the Ombudsman, to advance the rights and
freedoms contained in the constitution and international instru-
ments of human rights.195
3. The Mandatory and Optional Advisory Opinions for Ju-
dicial Bodies
The framers of the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction also
included Advisory Opinions for judicial bodies. The original bill
was designed only for the Chambers of the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice, Superior Cassation Courts, or judges of last resort. However,
the Plenary Court objected to this wording to expand it to the ju-
189. SOLANO, supra note 180, at 11.
190. Lilhanny Linkimer B., Control Previo de Constitucionalidad [Prior Constitutional
Control] (December, 2008) (Doctoral thesis, Escuela Libre de Derecho) (handout on file





195. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 98(c) - (ch).
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diciary. Consequently, the framers opted for a provision that
would include other judicial bodies, regardless of hierarchy.
196
Today the judiciary must request a mandatory advisory opinion
before the Constitutional Chamber in certain circumstances, 197 or
it may do so when the judge has reasonable doubts on the consti-
tutionality of an act that he must apply.198 Such a process may
also be used in circumstances to deem an act, conduct or omission
unconstitutional in the instant case. According to the law, the
criminal judges of last resort must seek a mandatory Advisory
Opinion, when a reconsideration of a final judgment in a criminal
case is requested. 99 The Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction
allows the review of a prior judgment according to the findings
and advice of the Constitutional Chamber on violations of due pro-
cess of law, on the right to be heard in trial, and the right to a de-
fense.200 This function is very narrow, because one of the Cham-
bers of the Supreme Court of Justice or any Criminal Cassation
Court is allowed to request an opinion of another Court of the Su-
preme Court of Justice on these procedural requirements.
Even though the Costa Rican Constitution prohibits the retrial
of criminal causes of action after final judgment, it expressly au-
thorizes this motion 201 and it is regulated by the Criminal Proce-
dure Code. 20 2 A criminal conviction can be reconsidered when new
evidence indicates that the sentence was based on false evidence
or on a contradictory criminal decision; when the decision is the
direct product of the judge's breach of his duties; or any other new
circumstance or evidence that proves the non-criminal conduct of
the convict, among other cases.
20 3
The optional Advisory Opinions are to be applied by a judge be-
fore any preclusive procedure or final decision is entered in the
196. Viquez, supra note 146.
197. SCCSJ, Sept. 19, 2001, SCIJ, No. 2001-9384 (Costa Rica). For the review of a prior
criminal conviction, the Law of the Constitutional Jurisdiction provides for an advisory
opinion on due process questions. However this requirement has been dosed down by a
decision of the Chamber, since well-established, long-standing precedents make up a con-
stant doctrine relating to the principles of due process that should be observed by the Crim-
inal Courts. Only when new or different questions emerge, the high court judges will be
obliged to petition for the opinion.
198. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 102.
199. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 102.
200. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 102 2.
201. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 42.
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case.20 4 Since the constitutional system is not diffusive, the re-
quest must be to the specialized Chamber of the Supreme Court of
Justice. 205 When the judge doubts the constitutional legitimacy of
a law, he may apply for an Advisory Opinion in an interlocutory
resolution and suspend the case. 20 6 If he believes that a law is
unconstitutional, he may complete a written decision, requesting
an Advisory Opinion from the Constitutional Chamber, to review
the constitutional question before he decides the case.
20 7
IV. CONFLICTS OF CONSTITUTIONALITY
There is also another procedure to settle conflicting constitu-
tional issues between public agencies regarding their constitu-
tional prerogatives (such as conflicts between autonomous agen-
cies and the executive branch or the Supreme Election Tribunal
and municipalities, etc.). 208 These procedures have been scarcely
applied and do not necessarily empower the enforcement of hu-
man rights. Instead, they are instruments for solving political
conflicts between governmental entities.
The petition must be submitted to the Constitutional Chamber
by the head of the agency or branch of government. 20 9 It will then
be communicated for a proper response from the institution, which
is the defendant, within eight days. 210 Once received, or if there is
no reply, the decision must be entered in ten days.211
V. EXECUTIVE VETO
The constitution regulates the executive veto in Articles 125,
126, 127 and 128.212
If the Legislative Assembly approves a bill, it must be sent to
the President for signature and sanctioning. 213 If there are no ob-
jections after the said ten days, the President must approve and
publish the legislation.214 He or she is entitled to return it in ten
days with any objections on grounds of opportunity and conven-
204. SCCSJ Nov. 13, 1990 SCIJ No. 1990-1628 (Costa Rica).
205. SCCSJ Mar. 2, 1995 SCIJ No. 1995-1185 (Costa Rica).
206. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 104.
207. SCCSJ Mar. 17, 1997 SCIJ No. 1997-01617, (Costa Rica).
208. CONSTITUCION DE LA REPTJBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 10, § a (1989).
209. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 110.
210. LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 110.
211. LAw OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION art. 111.
212. CONSTITUCI6N DE LA REPOBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 125-28 (1989).
213. Id. at art. 140.3 and 126.
214. Id. at art. 126.
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ience, or if he or she believes that it is in need of amendments. 215
In the latter case, he or she shall propose the modification when it
is returned to the Legislative Assembly. 216
In cases in which the Legislative Assembly does not accept the
reasons given by the Executive Power, the Legislative Assembly
may pass the bill by a vote of two-thirds of the total member-
ship. 217 If this occurs, it shall be sanctioned and enforced as a
law.2
18
If the Legislative Assembly accepts the amendments drafted by
the executive branch, on approval, it may not refuse to sanction
the law.219 However, if the proposed amendments are not accepted
and fail the two-thirds voting requirement, the bill shall be sent to
the archives and may not be reconsidered until the next legislative
period.22
0
If the executive branch of government refuses to sanction and
promulgate a bill on constitutional grounds, and the Legislative
Assembly rejects such arguments, the bill shall pass to the Consti-
tutional Chamber to decide the constitutional questions within a
period of thirty days. 221 The provisions held unconstitutional will
be struck down, and the rest shall receive the appropriate proceed-
ings such as the sanction and promulgation from the executive.
222
Hence, if the Constitutional Chamber decides that the bill com-




After 1821, since its inception, early Costa Rican systems of
government relied on many of the Cadiz Constitution principles
and the Constitution of the United States through the Central
American Federation. From then on, the constitutions put a
strong emphasis on a political control system of constitutional su-
premacy, relegating judicial review to the future. Under the 1871
constitution, however, legal provisions were enacted that clearly
created a diffusive system of judicial review, but many practical
215. Id.
216. Id.




221. Id. at art. 128.
222. CONSTITUcI6N DE LA REPJBLICA DE COSTA RICA DE 1949 art. 128 (1989).
223. Id.
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problems arose. To fix these problems, a requirement for a two-
thirds vote of the Plenary Court was created, which promoted a
concentrated judicial review system that emphasized an excessive
deference to the ordinary law and executive decrees.
The writs for habeas corpus and amparo were both introduced
in the Costa Rican Constitutional order at separate times. Habeas
corpus was first mentioned in the 1859 constitution. However, its
text delegated its enforcement through ordinary legislation that
did not come for fifty years, and the amparo claims would not be
implemented until after the 1949 civil war.
A significant development occurred under the 1949 constitution.
Forty years after its enactment, the 1989 amendments were
passed to create a concentrated and specialized Chamber of the
Supreme Court of Justice, which not only enhanced procedures,
but also substantive rights. The judicial review, the amparo and
habeas corpus proceedings, the advisory jurisdiction, and the con-
flicts of competence were substantially developed through the ju-
risdictional legislation. The impact was clearly felt, not only be-
cause of the availability and accessibility to any ordinary person to
discuss constitutional questions, but also because of the direct ap-
plicability of the constitutional standards and international in-
struments on human rights.
The 1989 amendments to the constitution created a sophisticat-
ed and comprehensive constitutional control system. The Consti-
tutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice vigorously ap-
plied constitutional standards where the jurisdictional law ex-
tends its reach 224. This system includes procedures and substan-
tive rights of a fundamental nature, modernizing the individual
and social rights dogma through the incorporation of the interna-
tional instruments of human rights that are applicable in the
country.
The period from 1989 to 2010 consists of a historical trend that
emphasizes a very successful system of constitutional justice, ap-
plying high standards and accountability to political and govern-
224. For the discussion of the Constitutional Chamber's relevant decisions see BARKER,
supra note 4, at 131 - 175. Professor Barker analyzes different judicial review cases that
show the enforcement of the action of unconstitutionality procedures I have referred to in
this document. See also, JUSTICE FERNANDO CRUZ CASTRO, COSTA RICA'S
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE, ITS POLITICAL IMPORTANCE AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW: EXAMINATION OF SOME DECISIONS, 45 DUQ. L. REV. 557-76
(2007). For additional discussion also see JUSTICE LUIS FERNANDO SOLANO CARRERA,
CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS: THE CASE OF COSTA RICA,
47 DUQ. L. REV. 871-904 (2009).
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mental actors. In return, an excessive number of cases have oc-
cupied much of the Chambers' time, pressing it to make legal
amendments. However, at the same time, the court has also tak-
en important steps to enhance its performance by utilizing the
technical resources that are available. Nevertheless, policymakers
and government officials are urging reforms to ease claims of ex-
cessive powers granted to the Constitutional Chamber, leaving it
at a crucial time where much of its success may be the main rea-
son that curtails its important functions.
Under these circumstances, only time will ease differences, in
order to maintain constitutional gains into the future. One must
remember that the constitutional jurisdiction protects those who
are not protected by the political process; they too must have the
ability to resort to an inexpensive judicial body to advance their
individual and social rights.
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